to change the dynamic within the commission itself? they've had this small group of three, minikrone clyburn, of course, the chairman, julius genachowski, now they're going to add two more, more staffs, more opinions, more meetings, is this going to slow down the process? >> guest: i don't think so. i think you're just going to see a continuation of the sort of, the point of views that come from the different parties. it's going to be the democrat-dominated, and you're going to continue to see d there are no outliers among the current commissioners, and the ones that are coming in don't particularly seem like they're outliers as well. so i think you'll see a continuation of things. things, you know, in terms of slowing things down, i think some of the arguments haven't been particularly fast now, so there's not much to slow. so, um, so, no, i don't think you're going to see a lot of

change. >> host: i think robert mcdowell might feel a little less alone sometimes, he'll have a friend. [laughter] i would imagine they're going to be a unified voting bloc. i think the interesting thing would be, you know, you'll have the chairman and probably commissioner clyburn on one side, those two on the other. i think commissioner rosenworcel's kind of the swing vote, and that makes it interesting. >> host: amy schatz, "wall street journal," cecilia kang, thank you both for the coming over, and they should be in office by the time this "communicators" airs. >> coming up next, a discussion about the u.s. role in managing global conflicts in postwar nations. then we're live with remarks by armed services committee ranking member john mccain on american defense and trade interests in asia. and later the senate returns at 2 p.m. eastern for debate on the

export/import bank bill that aims to help u.s. exporters sell their products and services overseas. >> later today former u.s. ambassador to nato, nicholas burn, releases his report on relations for insuring the long-term violent of the alliance. -- viability of the alliance. this comes ahead of this weekend's summit in chicago with president obama and other nato leaders. ambassador burns will speak at the atlantic council here in washington. you can watch his remarks live beginning at 4 p.m. eastern over on c-span. >> now, assistant secretary of state rick barton lays out several approaches for how the u.s. can maintain stability areas of global conflict by being what he calls a pivotal player, but not necessarily a dominant force. he recently spoke at the u.s. institute of peace in washington d.c. this is about 40 minutes. [applause]

>> well, thank you. thank you, pamela, and thanks to all of you, all friends. i do feel as if i am home, and i do feel as if usip is our home. and be so it's just a great, great pleasure to be among so many peace builders. all of you have dedicated so many wonderful years and superb efforts to this, and so as i look around the audience i just see people that i've admired for a long time, your dedication, your professionalism, your perseverance. one of the things i'm finding in this new job is that tenacity seems to be a fairly important quality, and it's not one that i would have necessarily have put at the top of my personal list, but i'm finding that there must be more of that new england

strain than i realized before i moved into the state department in this particular job a few months ago. but all of you have clearly shown that and thank you so much. without it we wouldn't be making the progress that we are today. thanks to melanie and dr. and mrs. cohen for making -- for the gift. [laughter] and, obviously, chick donbach. clearly, bob love us the, my pred he's to have -- predecessor who's here in the middle, he should probably stand up as well because he's made it possible for us to build on a pretty solid foundation. bob? [applause] he is here now at usip as well. so we stand at a breakthrough

moment, a chance to make the u.s. government more effective and coherent in building peace. and we must seize the this opportunity. to do that, we'll need your continuing help and openness to change. at cso our mission is to prevent violence and accelerate the departure from violence. we're trying to fashion an organization that can make an impact on policy and in programming in the first 12 months of a crisis. it's a high bar, and every time over the last six months that i've told people about our mission, i've heard the same two words spoken quite differently: good luck -- [laughter] and good luck. [laughter] in both cases people want us to

succeed, but i also hear concern that making an impact in some very challenging places is just too tough. we know we have a lot of work to do. all of us face difficult challenges not only in the places we work, but with the attitudes and the structures that confront us. for example, we know that almost 90% of -- 80% of recent conflicts stem from violence recurring within two years of a settlement or ceasefire. why? we know that donor countries' spending priorities in developing countries are remarkably consistent regardless of whether a country is at peace, in civil war or recovering from war. why? we know that an astounding 62 u.s. officers were involved in managing iraq reconstruction. why?

to answer these questions, to be more effective we see the need for some fundamental changes. the u.s. has spent significant effort and money the last decade to address conflict, but whether we spend $3 million or $3 trillion we haven't gotten it right. but with your help i believe it is possible. we also know that work like yours at the local level has contributed to the longer-term decline in conflict around the world. i believe we are on the cusp of historical change as dick mentioned. i believe this is change you have worked for and dreamt of or or -- of for a long time. i believe that your work has brought us to this tipping point moment, and for that i thank you. making history is not easy, but i believe that if we can work differently and work together, we have an excellent shot.

many of you have been on this road for quite a long time. it's not hard to see a narrative arc to the work at both the grassroots and international level. development groups that saw the links between violence and poverty began working to address the root causes of conflict. organizations like search for common ground and partners for democratic change began to practice this work more systematically. academics began to define its boundaries and train practitioners. i'm speaking of this like distant history, but many of those people are in this room today. meanwhile, the field began to take shape at high levels everywhere. in the early 1990s, the u.n. began to recognize our work as a distinct discipline. in 2005 the u.n. established the peace-building commission, peace-building fund and peace-building support office. in 2008 the u.n. adopted its latest definition of peace building, only 121 words.

and, of course, the quadrennial diplomacy and development review, qddr, released at the end of 2010 identified conflict prevention and response as a core mission of the state department. and led to the creation of cso. secretary clinton has told me and anyone else who will listen that cso is one of the most important things to come from the qddr, so i know she is invested in our success. by the way, i don't mean to suggest that cso is a crowning achievement of this movement. in fact, the u.s. must improve. but i do think that elevating these issues at state, giving them heft has been onof your minds for -- on many of your minds for some time, and it's a great honor to have a chance to try to bring it to life. the qddr reflects the broader fact that we have reached the critical maas of people who have

built a shared language and plan what needs to be done and work together to do it. we are coming to the greater recognition that building democracy, human rights, economic development or health all build peace. whether we call it peace building or stabilization or something else, we all need to work together to seize this moment. now, where will cso fit into this rather crowded space? our ambition is, essentially, to be more we effective in an increasingly demanding world as rob and dick described. as i mention bed, even within the u.s. government we haven't seen the best cohesion and coherence in our work on conflict. effectiveness also means a recognition that the u.s. is going to be a pivotal and vital player but not always a dominant force. we need to be humble. so we've got to think about the

length of our stay in a place and the resources available right from the beginning rather than saying we'll get in there and make it up as we go along. effectiveness also means boosting the impact of local ownership. everybody talks about local ownership and sustainability, but i still don't believe that we do it. and, frankly, we need to. we can't travel as freely as we used to, we need to expand our partners, we need to get around standard bureaucratic excuses, and can we don't want to get into a place and end up owning the problem. we've got to be much more agile in what we do and who we can count on to do other things. we must bring a new sense of focus and urgency to this work. what we are offering at cso is, essentially, a process. it starts with determining the center of gravity for each

engagement, someone with cross-cutting authority for the network of offices and people involved who welcomes help and encourages innovation. so that if, heaven forbid, we have 62 agencies working in a place, they know what each other is doing, and they're working with each other from the start. we think of it as a board of directors model. engage at the front end as many people as have an interest in the case. be inclusive, bring them all to the policy-making table. give them a chance to make their best arguments, but come to a decision on the way forward so that everyone buys in and no one can take a shot at it later. with that, we then need a fast, rigorous analysis that is built from the latest local realities. in and outside of the capitol. when the secretary interviewed me for this job, we talked about how when she visits a country,

she ends up inevitably with the same list of deliverablesser or respective of the case -- irrespective of the case. it's often terrorism, narcotics, aids, refugees, food security. all good causes. if you tell me which office or bureau is going out to do the analysis, i can tell you what kind of solutions they're going to come up with. [laughter] we want to avoid an institutional bias or predetermined responses and instead answer the question, what is most needed. we just helped with in this kind of analysis in burma. we worked on a seven-person team with three members from aid and four from the state department including one from cso under the us auspices of derek mitchell, the special envoy. we were just trying to make sure that those local voices are heard and that they drive the thinking that takes shape. as you know, cso has its own

analysis tool, the icaf, and i know that many of you have yours as well and sometimes they produce different conclusions. we want to learn from you and refine the icaf in large part to make it more strategic and influential. the analysis that we all do should lead to the next step, a single, integrated strategy with two to three priorities that provide direction for all. many of these places need everything so you can never be wrong from infrastructure to schools to justice systems. but the u.s. can't be a nation-building mode. jump-starting is still plenty ambitious, and we can't afford to work on priority numbers seven or eight. we need to be on one, two and three. we have to be catalytic and make sure that those local people have the ability to make it on their own.

next, the strategy leads directly to making sure that people and programs, resources address the priorities. burma will be a challenge in this regard. it's exotic, it's safe, everyone wants to work there. but to work coherently together will be a centerpiece of our or being effective. finally, we need to make sure that we are measuring and adjusting our work as we go, learning in realtime and not two years after the fact. with this approach i think we in the u.s. government can greatly increase our chances of success, and it will help us work better with all of you, hopefully n a transformational way. at cso we recognize that we have the coming year to prove that we can improve the response to show change and impact. so for this year we told the secretary we have three goals.

first, we have to make an impact in two to three places of real significance to the united states. to do that, we will dedicate 80% of our effort to four major cases. right now they are syria, kenya, north/central america and burma. then we'll have another eight to ten places where we can test new approaches or make a welcome difference by just sending the the right person at the right time. so far i think we're gaining traction in each of our major priority engagements. many of you are working in these places, and we realize that we won't know it all or know best about them, so we hope for your support. in syria we are providing a nontraditional surge to empower and unite a fractured, nonviolent opposition. as the secretary announced, that includes providing nonlethal assistance. we are also working with

partners to set up an outpost for the internal opposition to coordinate and communicate with the international community. in kenya we are helping to develop plans to insure peaceful and credible elections a year before the vote. incidentally, kenya is one place where we've seen a potential model for broad cooperation and innovation. in northern/central america we have a growing merchandise and governance problem -- homicide and governance problem, so we are bringing new urgency to address the violence on a regional basis, specifically to honduras, galt guatemala, el sar and belize. in burma, as i mentioned, we are supporting analysis and focusing on ways to connect with ethnic minorities at the subnational level. our second goal for this year is to build a trusted and respected team. we want to be the people in the u.s. government who bring

everyone together to find solutions to conflict. we've brought in an entirely new leadership team, refocused our predecessor organization, scrs, and are restructuring the civilian response corps and other core resources. we are reducing the size of the permanent corps to a proven leadership cadre who can lead our engagements. at the same time, we are expanding our reach to deploy experts from inside or outside the government on a pay-as-you-use basis. so instead of keeping a large, standing staff just in case of an eventuality, we are moving to the ability to deploy the right person to the right place just in time while expanding our partnerships. for example, this is one of my favorite stories. we recently got a call from the u.s. ambassador in liberia seeking our help. the day before the presidential runoff in november, a gone straight turned violent, and one

person was -- a demonstration turned violent, and one person was killed, and eight were injured by gunfire. some felt the police were implicated. the liberian commission to investigate the incident didn't have the capacity to conduct an inquiry which in turn put the goodwill of the government at risk. cso sent an expert from our civilian response corps who assured the investigation was on track. liberian investigators interviewed 70 or 80 people and found a 15-second slice of video of the demonstration that showed specific police firing on the crowd. it actually happened in three different ways. one of the liberian investigators first saw a plainclothessed person in a rather exotic shirt with a heavy

armband firing into the crowd. actually, the video showed a pop be, a little bit of smoke, and you could hear the noise. and still photography confirmed who that person was, it turned out the a high-ranking member of the presidential guard. that same saw 15-second clip was shown to the department of justice investigator who then saw another policeman in the same frame shooting -- this one in uniform -- shooting into the crowd. he then showed that same video clip to the commission members, the liberian commission members, and one of them then saw a third person in that same 15-second clip firing into the crowd. that became the critical evidence that has led to police suspensions, further investigation and the president of the country taking responsibility. it's a great case for the rule

of law and for the strengthening of the political process. it also shows that who we are and how we work are as important as what we're trying to do. to make quality 'em pact in the first -- impact in the first 12 months of a crisis takes agility and information that's different from the way the u.s. often works. our third goal is to work in a more agile and innovative way. part of that is developing a model for expeditionary diplomacy in the field, and part is working as an antidote to the bureaucracy in washington. as we know, the bureaucracy can move like an elephant. it is powerful but very large, and so you can reasonably predict where it's going and be sure not to be underfoot. our goal is to work in a more nimble, speedy fashion which means with more help from our partners. i used to ask audiences would

you rather spend $500 million on the largest u.s. embassy in the world this a place like bag baghdad, or would you rather spend $500 million to train 500 americans -- one million for each of them -- so they would be capable of working in a place like baghdad? how many of you would favor the embassy? is. [laughter] so we pretty much agree. almost unanimously. but i've got bad news for you. since i started asking this question, they built the embassy. it cost a lot more than $500 million, and we're trying to figure out what to do with it. so we've got to find a way to do things differently. violet conflict has -- violent conflict has unofficially dominated u.s. foreign policy for years, so we need to expand the community of people who

recognize its centrality and can address it head on. there's a lot of room for improvement, and i hope that we can join in doing that together. i want to take a moment now to address the tension that we sometimes feel when nongovernmental groups and governments find themselves in the same space. the u.s. has its national interests at heart, and ngos often strive for neutrality, and those are not always the same thing. i think the key is to be very honest about when our interests are in sync and when we might need a little space. we should feel like we can help each other but also keep our distance when necessary without it being a snub. good, open communications should make that possible. with that, i want to offer you a challenge.

when i was at csis and we went out to measure progress in afghanistan, for the first time almost everyone i spoke to was telling us how what they were doing was working while the larger enterprise was not going well. so we had a situation where we heard 100 success stories that somehow added up to one very questionable, larger effort. there's no mathematical equation that allows 100 pluses to equal a negative. of course, almost everybody had an explanation, but it completely reinforced the flaws in the approach that we take to these places. so here's some questions that i wonder if you're asking yourselves; are you working in the places that really matter? even though it's impossible to be transformative, is the larger or situation getting any better as a result of your involvement? even if you're doing brilliant

work, what's happening on the broader scale? asking these questions is part of our goal and, i hope, part of yours. we're looking at the next dramatic event in how the united states can be a more intelligence responder and anticipator and intervener and catalytic force. these are the questions of our time. in this space we see these questions in their rawest form. people are actually killing each other. because they can't figure it out. and there's nothing more profound in human life than people killing each other because they can't figure it out. so we're the most fascinating,

most dell crate, most demanding, most responsible -- we're at the most dell crate, most demanding, most responsible moment possible, and we're trying to say is there some way the united states can help so it doesn't lead to something, much more tragic? we need your help. if you ever hear me say we're on top of this, we've got it under control, give me a call or send me an e-mail. because we need all the help we can get. there is plenty to be done. we need to keep building the momentum for this work in congress, elsewhere in the government and with our partners of all stripes. we need to expand the base of people who believe in this work, and as i said, it can't be business as usual. thank you very much. [applause]

>> rick has kindly offered to take some questions if there are questions from the audience. i do have to ask a question myself. will somebody be handing around the microphones, or do people go to the side? >> handing them out. >> handing them out. please, raise your hand so that the handers-out can see you and stand up and introduce yourself. there's a question down here.

>> i'm bob rigg, member of the board of alliance. i'm wondering, you know, in this more complicated world we're in we'll want a lot of company on the journey that you have mentioned internationally, that is the questions you've raised we'll want asked within a lot of governments. and i'm wondering in your initial soundings with counterparts in other governments in nato and so forth if your questions are resonating well. >> thanks, bob. yes. [laughter] i've always wanted to give at least one mike mansfield answer. as you all know, i'm more likely to go on than to be as succinct as he was, but i still admire his skill. the answer is, yes. i mean, whether we're talking to the command leaders here in the u.s. government or the u.k.

government or even the colleagues that i had a chance the work with when i was at the u.s./u.n. in new york. i think there's a great recognition that we've really got to go at this in a much more creative fashion. and one of the things that i notice having worked on this for about 20 years and maybe 30 or plus places now is that we tend to be, most of us tend to be influenced by our most recent experience, and i think that puts us at risk in this country because our most recent experience is such a huge one in iraq and afghanistan. and yet i think as dick suggested that this next round of conflicts that we're looking at really have a different flavor, different also from what we saw in the 1980s when where, where of us were mostly shaped by bosnia, although there were, obviously, other catastrophes going on. so i think part of it is to make

sure we're accumulating this knowledge rather than thinking we've actually got it. and there's, for me, one of the things that's been most fascinating is i never know where i'm going to get the parallel experience. i was surprised to find be in the congo that there was more, a little more of haiti than i'd expect, and in angola there was more of serbia than i would have thought. and now why would -- but normally we would put kind of regional experts or, so it's part of what we want to do is to have an intellectually-challenging enough of an environment that there's a creative tension within the state department so we don't end up rushing to a consensus view within the u.s. government that this is the way to do something, but really make it a more rigorous test. ..

>> guest: competition and creative tension should be part of this model and so that's why you almost never hear me use the word coordination although i believe we really have to work as well together as a fine textile. >> do you want to take your own questions? >> i can probably see, help

for anything for that matter. let me go back here by the microphone this gentleman back here. yes. >> thank you. from the american university and center for international relations. i am from greece actually i found myself working on this report i wasn't expecting in my lifetime to do. it has to do with the greece as a failed state and the liability, i mean in terms of regional security in case that greece becomes a failed state. so the question that i have is, how many steps ahead can the usa be around the world in cases like greece and others that are not there yet but they are close to becoming? so considering the limited capacities in terms of money and resources, how many

steps can usa be before things get bad? >> well, fortunately i can answer for cso and say that we have partners like usip that can probably get out ahead of us even farther in some of these cases. i would hope that many of you would be well ahead of us because that would mean, that could give me some greater sense of confidence that we're on top of this. one. things that worries me i'm quite sure in some cases, i don't think this is true in the case of greece but the u.s. military often times has war plans for -- >> just a few minutes left in this program. you can see it all at c-span.org. live now to the center for strategic and international studies for a speech from senator john mccain this morning. he is talking about u.s. interests in the asia-pacific region. introducing mr. mccain is

the usci president, john hamre. >> we don't want to delay any further to hear from senator mccain. it is a real source of pleasure and honor for me to be able to welcome senator john mccain back to css. he has been a long term, steady support to what we do and i will have to say i, more important today than ever when i look at the landscape of political washington who is bringing a strategic frame of reference to evaluate the most complicated problems? this man's at the very top. one of the concerns i've had he has four years -- for years been a champion for americans understanding asia. i mean nobody has worked harder at this than john mccain and he's had transcending moral authority to be able to do that. so where is that next generation coming? and i'm very greatful for

his response when he said he is going to help mentor the next generation of senators who are coming in by giving them exposure to asia. god knows we need it. the center of gravity has moved but americans don't know it. and they don't know it because they aren't exposing themselves to this very dynamic landscape as senator john mccain a towering figure in the united states senate. hard for me not to get emotional when i think about all he has done for this country. so he continues to do that every day and i'm very grateful he is willing to share his perspective on this issue. i do want to say special thanks to our friends who have made it possible for us to hold this series. this is a series we're doing on trans-pacific partnership speaker series and made possible by google, hewlett-packard, ibm, pfizer and proctor & gamble. i want to say thank you to them for that because they're willing to bring a

public debate to the american people and make it available and we're very greatful for that. and of course to have someone like senator john mccain leading this debate and this dialogue in washington, it just isn't better than that without any further delay, let me, would you please welcome senator john mccain. [applause] >> thank you, john. thank you john, for that kind introduction. i was just reflecting as you were speaking, i think our relationship and friendship goes back well over 20 years and maybe closer to 30 but, anyway. we're getting to the point where we hide our own easter eggs. so i'm very happy that, let me that ernie bower and everyone here at csi s for inviting me to speak this morning. csis in my view is one of the finest institutions in this city and i benefit

immensely and often from its outstanding work and from the wise counsel of my old friend john hamre and his team. let me also say how much i spreecialt all of you for taking the time out of your busy schedules to be here. i'm grateful that you still care when a member of congress has to say. [laughter] most americans no longer do. last time i checked the approval rating of congress is now 11% and i've yet to meet anyone in the 11% category. we're down now to blood relatives and paid staffers. [laughter] and i'm not so sure anymore about the blood relatives. you know i joke about this a lot and the's always good for a laugh but the truth is that it's sad. it's sad how little faith americans have in their government and it's not just americans. i might just last week with a business delegation from

malaysia and one of them said, senator mccain, when we look at america these days you seem totally dysfunctional. your political system seems incapable of making the basic decisions to fix your physical problems and project resolve to the world. and by the way he said, some in asia are citing these failings to undermined the confidence that your friends still have in you. you know what? i couldn't disagree with him. this is an enormous problem and it raises doubts about our commitment in the asia-pacific region. while it's wrong to speak of a quote, pivot to asia, the idea that we must rebalance u.s. foreign policy with an increasing emphasis on the asia-pacific region that is undoubtedly correct. the core challenge we face is how to make this rebalancing effort meaningful for at the moment amid all our political physical problems we run the

risk of overpromising and underdelivering on our renewed commitment across the pacific. it is difficult to overstate the gravity of the choices before us right now. we face immediate decisions that will determine the vector of american power in the asia-pacific region diplomaticly, economically, a and militarily for decades to come. we have to get our bearings right. if we fail we will drift off course and fall behind. however if we get the decisions right we can create the enduring conditions to expand the supply of american power, to strengthen american leadership and to secure america's national interests across the pacific. after all while the context in asia is changing america's interests in asia have not. we will still seek the same objectives we always have, the ability to prevent, deter and if necessary,

prevail in a conflict. the defense of u.s. allies, the extension of free trade, free markets, free navigation and free commons, air, sea, space, and now cyber and above all the maintenance of a balance of power that fosters the peaceful expansion of human rights, democracy, rule of law, and the many other values that the we share with increasing numbers of asian citizens. none of these interests is directed against any other country including china. the continued peaceful development of china is in our interests. we reject the notion that america wants to contain china or that we seek a new cold war in asia where countries are forced to choose between the united states and china. in short, the question we must answer is, can we in america make the big strategic decisions right now that will position us for long-term success in asia?

one of these decisions pertains to trade. it's often said that the business of asia is business but when it comes to trade the united states has been sitting on the sidelines and asia is sprinting toward, forward without us. after four years this administration still has not concluded or ratified a single free-trade agreement of its own making. it took them until last year just to pass the ftas with korea, colombia and panama that the bush administration had concluded. meanwhile since 2003 china has secured nine ftas in asia and and latin america alone. it is negotiating five more and it has four others under consideration. and it is not just china. the japanese prime minister announced last week that he wants japan to begin negotiations on a free trade

area with china and south korea. india is now negotiating a fta with the european union and yet we will not even conclude a narrower bilateral investment treaty with india let alone a full fta as we should. as of last year one report found that asian countries had concluded or were negotiating nearly 300 trade agreements, none of which included the united states of america. the launch of the trans-pacific partnership has brightened this picture a bit but a deal may be years off if it happens at all. instead, we should be moving forward with bilateral trade agenda startingp with india and taiwan. we should also move more aggressively on a multilateral track. the trans-pacific partnership splits the

countries. we either need to bring all of the ocian countries in the trans-pacific partnership or push for a formal u.s.-ocian -- asean agreement. the long-term economic success requires an ambitious world trade center strategy in asia. a second decision big enormous implications is our regional force posture. i want to thank csis for its continued leadership on this issue. we all share the same goals. strengthening the u.s.-japan alliance while maintaining our strategic commitments in the asia-pacific region and through a robust presence of forward-deployed military forces. like many of you however, some of us on the senate armed services committee were critical of the previous plan to realign u.s. forces on okinawa and guam which had been totally unaffordable. the costs of the gaum move

alone had doubled in seven years to more than $20 billion. this crisis actually presents an opportunity for a broader look at our regional force posture. some asian countries are showing new interest in a greater rotational presence of u.s. forces in the region. the recent agreement to rotate 2500 u.s. marines through australia could serve as a model for similar activities elsewhere such as the philippines. ultimately these and other new development offer an opportunity to think creatively and comprehensively about a new regional force posture which should conclude a fresh approach to the rea alignment on okinawa and guam. that's why the congress included in last year the national defense authorization act for an independent assessment of these force posture questions. i am pleased that csis is

conducting this important study. it remains unclear how the recent joint statement of the u.s.-japan security consultative commit me will fit into this environment on regional force posture. at this time the joint statement raises more questions than it answers. among them questions on cost estimates, logistical requirements, force sustainment, master plans, and how this proposal relates to a broader strategic concept of regional operations. we need to get these important decisions right and that's why even as we seek additional details on the joint statement congress will not make any major funding decisions until we receive and evaluate the independent assessment on asia-pacific force posture that is required by law. similar and far larger decision that we must also

get right is our defense spending. the asia-pacific region is premary a maritime theater so our ability to project military power there depends mostly on the u.s. navy and yet the navy is still short of its own goal of 313 ships. what's worse the administration now proposes to retire seven cruisers earlier than planned, to phase out two major lift ships needed by the marine corps and to delay the acquisition of one large deck amphibious ship, one virginia class attack submarine, two literal combat ships and eight high-speed transport vessels. we are now retiring ships faster than we are replacing them. cuts to our naval capabilities such as these without a plan to compensate for them only put our goals in the asia-pacific region at greater if risk. and all of this is before

the potential impact of sequestration. the cuts to our defense budget required under sequestration would be nothing less than a unilateral act of disarmament that would insure the real decline of u.s. military power. a number of us in congress have offered proposals to avoid sequestration but we do not have a monopoly on good ideas. we want to sit down with the president, work out a bipartisan deal but the president refuses to engage. he has no proposal to prevent what his own secretary of defense called quote, catastrophic cuts to our national defense. unless the president gets enpaged on a this issue, he will preside over the worst hollowing out of our armed forces in recent memory. in addition to our military presence we must sustain our means of engaging diplomaticly in asia and here we have a better story to tell. thanks largely to our

secretary of state who is making u.s. diplomacy, more present and impactful than ever in the region, that said we face major tests now that will signal what role america will play in asia and how relevant we will be to asia's challenges. one such test is the south china sea. the united states has no claims in this dispute and we should not take positions on the claims of others. nonetheless this dispute cuts to the heart of america's interests in asia. not just because $1.2 trillion of u.s. trade passes through the south china sea every year and not just us because one claimant, the philippines, is a u.s. ally, but because it is crucial for a rising asia to avoid the dark side of realpolitik where strong states do as they please and smaller states suffer. ultimately this dispute is

not about china and the united states. it is about china's relations with its neighbors but we must support our asean partners as they requested so they can realize their own goals of presented a united front and peacefully resolving their differences multilaterally. another major test for u.s. diplomacy is burma. i have traveled to burma twice over the past year and to be sure they still have a long way to go especially in stopping the violence and pursuing genuine reconciliation with the country's ethnic minorities but the burmese president and allies in the government i believe are sincere about reform and they are making real progress. for the past year i have said that concrete actions by burma's government toward democratic and economic reform should be met with reciprocal actions by the united states that can

strengthen these reforms, benefit ordinary burmese and improve our relationship. following the recent election that brought chi and the national league for democracy into the parliament i think now is the time to suspend u.s. sanctions, especially, except, except for the arms embargo and targeted measures we maintain defense individuals and individuals in burma undermined democracy, violate human rights and plunder the nation's resources. this would not be a lifting of sanctions, just a suspension and this step as well as any additional easing of sanctions would depend on continued progress and reform in burma. we must also establish a principled and ideally binding of corporate social responsibility for u.s. business activities in burma.

kyi made the distinction between the wrong and right kind of investment the right kind of investment would strengthen burma's private sector, benefit its citizens and ultimately loosen the military's control over the economy and civilian government. the wrong investment would do the opposite. entrench being a new oligarchy and setting back burma's development for decades. for this reason i'm not convinced that american companies should be permitted to do business at this time with state-owned firms in burma that are still dominated by the military. u.s. business will never win a race to the bottom with some of their asian or even european competitors and they should not try. rather they should align themselves with aungk kyi and burmese people who want responsible investment, high labor and environmental standards and support for human rights and national sovereignty that define

american business at its best. our goal should be to set the global standard for corporate social responsibility in burma and a standard that we as well as aung kyi could use to pressure others to follow our lead. that could become the basis for new burmese laws. these are all undoubtedly large challenges and they would require us to set aside political bickering and point-scoring in order to advance some of our most vital national security interests. i am confident that we can come together and do this. i am confident that the profits of american decline can once again be proved wrong and i will tell you why. because even as we work to sustain the supply of american power, the demand for american power in asia has never been greater. i will give you one example. on my last visit to burma i pet met with the president. he had most of his cabinet

there. after the meeting i walked over to shake their hands. as i went down the line, one of them said, fort leavenworth, 1982. another one said, for the benning in, 1987. it went on like that. i realized many of these guys who were former military officers who were part of our military exchange programs prior to our severing relations with the burmese military. even after all this time, all of our troubled history, they remembered america fondly and they wanted to get closer to america once again. take another example. why are dissidents and asylum-seekers in china running to the american embassy when they fear for their safety? they aren't going to the russian embassy or the south african embassy or even european embassies. why is that? is it because we're powerful? surely but other nations also have great power.

is it because we're a democracy that stands for the equal rights and dignity of all people? certainly. but these values are not ours alone. so then why is it? in short it is because we marry our great power and our democratic values together and we act on this basis. it is because among the community of nations america still remains unique, exceptional, a democratic great power that uses its unparalleled influence not just to advance et cetera own narrow interests but to further a set of transcend ant values. above all, why so many countries in asia and elsewhere are drawn to us. because we put our power into the service of our principles. that is why during my repeated travels through asia, i meet person after person, leader after leader, who wants america to be their partner of choice.

they don't want less of america. they want more. more of our trade, more of our diplomatic support and yes, more of our military assistance and cooperation. at a time when most americans say they're losing faith in our government we should remember that there are millions of people in the world especially in the asia-pacific region who still believe in america and who still want to live in a world shaped by american power, american values, and american leadership. with so many people counting on us, and by no means counting us out, the least we can do is endeavor to be worthy of the high hopes they still have in us. thank you very much. [applause] >> thank you, senator mccain,

for the great speech. i would like to open the floor. this session is of course on the record. just, when you have a question please introduce yourself and let us know what organization you're with and i will try to see people on that side but, senator, i may need your help on hands there. i will start with andre. >> i like your hat. >> thank you, sir. thank you very much. i'm honored to be the first one called for -- senator, wonderful to hear you with your ideas. i have to i'd myself. i we have known each other from the same war and aspirations and true american interest in asia. my question is this, i'm so happy to hear your comment about how we're we, the united states continue to want to improve our relationship with china and the other countries, not

contain china or anything like that. at the same time you made the point we need to stand with our asean friends with for all the reasons i don't need to repeat. you said them very well. i my question specifically is this, isn't this a good time for administration, any administration, to lift the embargo against export of lethal weapons to vietnam because this seems to me our security relationship is evolving to the point where this would make sense? appreciate your ideas, sir? >> i view as one of the few things that i've done in my life that i'm very proud of is establishment of normalization of relations between the united states and vietnam. i think it went a long way to healing a lot of the wounds that needed closing. you about i have to be very

candid with you. i'm concerned, i remain concerned about the vietnamese treatment of buddhists, of christians, minorities, and of course the corruption that exists at very high level. the scandal the shipyard in hai phong is just the most visible example of it. over the years i've grown more and more reliant of human rights organizations. they're important in our considerations and i found over the years in many instances they are right and human rights organizations tell me that the persecution of buddhists, christians, minorities and others continues. and there's no reason for it. i visit vietnam fairly often and i say to their leaders, what's the point?

what's the point here? and i don't know if it is old habits or it's some fear that there may be some uprising or some reason but, i think we can set, and obviously the state department we could say certain standards that are set that could be met. then we could have much closer relations in another, with them. and let me just finally say the vietnamese of course are nervous about china. they have a long history that they are very, very form lar with and -- familiar with. it shows the fact about a year ago a ship named after my father and grandfather paid a port visit to the port of danang, shows if you live long enough anything can happen in this world. i love the vietnamese people. i love vietnam.

i think it is a country, look at the way our country has been enriched by those who fled to come here. it is not anything that has to do with personal but when i hear of persecution that still goes on it seems to me that the vietnamese have more maturation to accomplish before we provide them with offensive weapons. >> in the front here. >> [inaudible]. >> could you wait for the microphone, please? >> sure. >> good morning, senator. from south asia journal. defining america interests in asia but i did notice you didn't mention once, pakistan iran or afghanistan which i believe have very important role in defining american interests in asia. could be liberate on that

please? >> thank you. if i had brought up iran, pakistan and afghanistan we would have had a whole another speech but very briefly, obviously iran pose as great challenge to peace in the world. there's now a new set of negotiations going on with the iranians over nuclear weapons. i'm not as optimistic as some because i've seen this movie before but i am not opposed to anytime sitting down as long as it's just simply not a process of delay while they can make further progress. afghanistan i was very, very pleased at the strategic partnership agreement that was concluded. it's like any other agreement. we want to see the details but the problem of, there are two major problems we've had in afghanistan. one is corruption and the other is the presence of sank wary in pakistan but

there was also, as i'm sure you're aware, a widespread feeling in the region that the united states was leaving. the famous anecdote about the taliban prisoner and the american interrogator and he says you've got the watches, we've got the time. i would hope that the strategic partnership agreement if correctly implemented and that's a huge if, but would change the mindset in that part of the world that the united states does not intend to abandon as we basically did iraq. in the words of general keane in the story of iraq, we won the war and we're losing the peace. in case you just missed the story yesterday of the fail lure of our ability to train even their police forces but it's, believe me, things will get a lot worse in iraq before this unfortunate saga is over at the tragic loss

of 1474 young americans but. next time i'm invited to csis i invite you to come and i will give a talk about, about it. thank you. >> gentleman in the front here in the blue tie. >> thank you, senator mccain. i'm a former world bank firm and former senator from pakistan. pakistan is a key ally to the united states and in fact only -- ally. next week is chicago summit. what do you see the role of pakistan? thank you. >> pakistan is vital to the united states's national security interests for a broad variety of reasons including the nuclear inventory that pakistan has. including the fact that pakistan's role in the region is vital, not to

mention relations with india but we have to operate in our relations with pakistan the realization, that the isi, has close relations with the haqqani network and they are carrying out activities that kill americans. that's just an assessment can not be refuted by the facts. and it saddens me. we were talking earlier just before this, one of the gravest mistakes in recent history was the so-called pressler amendment which basically cut off our military to military relations and we're still paying a very heavy price for. i think there are some who would argue that pakistan is a failed state. i don't argue that but i do, could argue plausibly that the politics in pakistan are very, very unsettled to say the least and it is our

interests to have good relations with pakistan. it is in our interests to aid pakistan and try to assist them to a better democracy and a lessening of corruption and a severing of relations between the isi and the haqqani met work but we -- network. but we can not force it. if there is any lesson we have to learn over and over again we can't force the pakistani government and people to change their way unless they want to. it is so disheartening sometimes to see the lack of progress towards a meaningful democracy and rule of law and all the things that we would hope that the pakistanis might achieve. but whether we are successful in persuading them or not pakistan will remain a country that is a

vital to united states national security interests. i don't have to draw for you the various scenarios of a breakdown in their government. so i hope we will continue to work with the pakistanis in every possible way we can but we must take a totally realistic approach to our relations with pakistan. >> meredith. >> meredith broad bent, csis. are you comfortable with the pace of trans-pacific partnership negotiations and how do he balance the relationship with others that want to join. >> i'm not satisfied obviously with the pace of negotiations. i point out it is saddening when we see china concluding all these free-trade agreements and the other countries in the region and the united states of america, in the last more than three years we have concluded three free-trade agreements

which had been negotiated by a previous administration. that's a shameful record. every other country in the world practically is recognizing the benefits of free-trade agreements and yet we are, we are beholden to special interests and trade unions and so the special interests frankly are the car companies as you know. and, and the trade unions which impose restrictions and when we abandon the fas fast-track methodology through congress, then it makes it even worse. so when i travel around at your expense i -- [laughter] i hear them, they want a free-trade agreement with us. they, they're saying why can't you do it? and this concept of a pacific partnership is magnificent. i mean it could be one of the greatest breakthroughs we have had in recent

history if we can just move forward with it. i'm not here, i know we're in election he year. i'm not here to beat up on the administration that would be easy enough for me to do but it requires presidential leadership and it requires setting priorities. president clinton set the free-trade agreement between the united states and canada as a priority. and congress then, then reacted. so in all due respect the president ought to give a speech, come here to csis and give a speech and say we're going to conclude this pacific partnership agreement. i just came from chicago where we had some of our neighbors there and by golly, it is the best thing that america could do for our, and keep jobs at home. so sometimes if i sound frustrated it is because i am because the rest of the world is understanding the value to their own count

trizs of free-trade agreements while we discuss a very nice concept. >> for the record the president is invited to csis if he want to come. >> it won't help if i recommend it. [laughter] >> jonathan broder from "congressional quarterly"ly. >> niece to see you again. >> thank you. in couple weeks talks between united states and iran will resume in baghdad. i wanted to ask your, your thoughts about reciprocity. the administration has talked about the principle of reciprocity for those talks and whether you think that the goal of the sanctions that congress has, has placed on iran and the administration is enforcing should be a deal to end their nuclear program or regime change?

>> first of all i am not optimistic about the possible results of these quote, talks. the first talks were greeted with great enthusiasm because they agreed to talk again. i've seen that movie before. we've seen it not only as far as iran is concerned but north korea. so again, i'm for talks. anybody who isn't i think obviously is foolish but, for us to not take a realistic approach to these conversations i think is also flies in the face of history. i don't think there's any doubt that the sanctions are hurting iran and seriously hurting their economy. i don't think there is any doubt about that.

you can look at a number of indicators about the iranian economy to show that these sanctions have hurt rather significantly but i've yet to see a erosion on the part of the popular support of this iranian government for development of nuclear weapons and i have yet to see any real meaningful concessions made by the iranians and i have yet to see any change in the path that they are on towards development of nuclear weapons. what really should happen, instead of sending your national security advisor and chairman of the joint chiefs of staff to israel and tell the israelis not to attack iran and then leak it to the press which obviously just weakens the israelis, and especially with this new government in israel, that we should sit down with the

israelis and establish red liens and those could be four or five provisions. one of them obviously being state of enrichment. others, further development in their facilities. you could, we could write them down on the back of an envelope and say to the israelis, okay, these are the red lines and we're telling the iranians these are the red lines. as the president has said, it is unacceptable in his statement for the iranians to develop nuclear weapons. then we could be in close alliance with the israelis. as you know netanyahu has formed a new government. i think that gives him more latitude on talks with the palestinians but i also think it gives him a broader range of support if the israeli government, and i emphasize if the israeli government acts militarily.

everybody is worried about the reaction in the arab world to an attack by israel on iranian nuclear facilities. my friends, behind closed doors there would be celebration in arab countries all over the world, have no doubt about that. they do not want, the arab world does not want iran to have nuclear weapons. triggers proliferation throughout the region. the rivalries as we all know is taking place in places like bahrain and others including competition in iraq. so all i can say is that it was a little disappointing to hear that our first meeting was so great and wonderful and there was frank conversations and they agreed to meet again. in baghdad and now i hear they're already planning another place to meet after that. we've seen the movie before.

>> joe, right here. >> joe botsco formerly with the defense department and with ernie's program. nice to see you, senator and thanks for another great speech. >> thank you. >> you mentioned north korea. two weeks ago the secretary panetta testified to the armed services committee that china is providing technical assistance to north korea's missile programs program, missiles by the way which are targeted for the united states. in light of that what is your view of administration's position to lift some of the export controls to china on lethal weapons? >> you know, one of the, kind of i think it's he convention@wisdom, china looks00 of years in the

future and they have thousands of years of history. china is thinking three moves ahead of us in the chessboard. if that is true why in the world do they continue to prop up the north korean ledge sfweem -- regime? why in the world would you want to prop up a regime has 250,000 people starving to death in a gulag? why would you do you want to support a regime that continues only cachet in the world is nuclear weapons and continues to try to move forward not only with development, means to deliver them but exporting those kinds of technologies into the volatile parts of the world? the new chinese leader was here in town and four or five of us met with him. i said why, why do you continue to prop up this regime? it's a plot on the reputation of your government? and his answer was, and i'm not making this up. chinese translator, senator mccain is well-known in

china for his candor. that, that was his answer. that is not a serious answer. i'm a serious person. that is not a serious answer but it was this kind of charm tour he was on in the united states. so i worry about irrational behavior on the part of the north koreans. i worry about a young man, you know, i guess general custer was a general at age 23. well, we have got now a guy in north korea, he is a four-star general at age 27, is it? great. but the point is that there's a great, there's instability there and it's a very unstable situation and we need to worry about it. why china and russia continue to veto sanctions on syria, why the chinese

continue to prop up this regime and they are the openly once that can really influence this regime as you know. is something that i don't understand and with all this recent events, chen and the murder of a chinese, of the british citizen, i wonder, i wonder about the real permanency of this regime that is now running china and whether with things like a blackberry and a tweet and all of those things whether there may not be maybe some real dissent in china as a result of some of the things we are finding out. i don't see how a group of men who most of the 1.3 billion people in china don't even know their names, can continue to meet once a year in a seaside resort and

determine the future of 1.3 billion people without something having to change either sooner or later. i do not predict any cataclysmic events in china, please don't get me wrong but that, i guess what i'm trying to say in summary is, when i was present as a, as a not so young naval officer with a group of senators at the occasion of the normalization of relations with china the great hall and peng was going around and everybody was drinking the care seen and i'm sure he was drinking water, we had high hopes for china. we thought there would be a significant amount of progress. and in a number of areas i don't think we've seen, and a number of areas, i don't

think those expectations have been fulfilled. i do not envision any confrontation between the united states and china. it is not in china's interests. not in the it. >>'s interests. i do not envision that but i do think that there is going to be some internal problems the chinese are going to have to grapple with. >> the young woman in the back in the black. >> thank you very much. good morning. thank you, senator. my name is chin with the voice of america. thank you for your candid answer. follow-up to joe's question. the united states and china just concluded the fourth strategic and economic dialogue not long ago. i remember years ago you voted yes to grant china normal trade, pntr. normal trade relations to china. do you think the trade between the united states and china is in good, in the

right track? and also, would you please elaborate what you just said, that you support a free-trade agreement between china, and between the united states and taiwan. thank you. >> i do support a free-trade agreement between the united states and taiwan and i have support free-trade agreements, actually, you know the proposed specific overall trade agreements. the first question, part of --? >> [inaudible]. >> u.s.-china trade, are we on the right track. >> i think that the trade, we obviously is. we all know how serious trade deficit with china and i do that we could make significant improvements there. we're becoming more competitive. if there is any bright spot in this terrible recession that we have been through it's the productivity of the american worker has

dramatically increased and made us far more competitive throughout the world, at great cost. but the looming issue between the united states and china is cybersecurity. we are grappling with that issue in the congress now as far as legislation. we've created a cyber command. we are trying to address this issue. not only from a military standpoint of cybersecurity but as importantly on a trade and intellectual property issue. we know for a fact that the chinese have hacked into and gotten many, a lot of our technology. they have been able to acquire through, through the cyber, quote, cyber activities. i'm not saying cyber warfare but cyber activities. they even hacked into my campaign.

that shows you the depths they would plummet is amazing. must have been a boring day in beijing when but anyway. so i think that our trade situation with china can show significant improvement but the issue of cybersecurity between the united states and china, and the united states and other countries, not just china but china is the greatest violator is going to be a very serious issue in relations between our two countries. he --. >> paul course son with cnn nice to see you. to build on the response to the north korean question. china only holds influence over them. does that mean the united states doesn't have a role in influencing north korea directly? >> i think the united states should do everything it can. the sanctions unfortunately lifted by the bush

administration, including their bank accounts in macau and other activities we had sanctioned i think one of the great mistakes the bush administration made. and i think we should continue to make every effort to modify their behavior. we could do that by a closer relations with south korea. maintaining our military presence. there's a number of areas that we continue to be active in but the only country that can really force change in north korea obviously is china. they could shut down their economy in a week or two. at least that's maybe an exaggeration but they certainly can have a significant effect on north korean behavior. and they have got the levers of power to do that. i keep hearing from, maybe if not the apologists, certainly those who have a differing view than i do saying, well, china is

afraid of a unified korea. if korea became unified you think that germany had problems in absorbing what was then east germany into their economy? my god, this is, this is, since 1945 a country that knows no principles of capitalism, of free enterprise, of democracy. the challenge that would be to meet to integrate north and south korea would take years and years and years. it wouldn't be a threat to china. how, how does a unified korea really pose a threat to the world's superpower? it is just foolishness. and so, again, you know we all, all countries develop reputations in the world and i want us to have the closest and most progressive relations with china possible but when they veto sanctions, joint russian

veto sanctions on syria, when they, when these recent activities such as mr. chen having to come to the embassy, the murder of the british citizen, the chinese have to understand that as a world superpower that there's a certain level of conduct that the world expects them to maintain. and think a lot of people would make a judgement they are not measuring up to those standards that a, a major contributor to peace and progress in the world should be making. >> senator, i'm mindful of your time. >> do two more. please. >> [inaudibleñ. >> go ahead. >> thank you, senator. i'm with voice of vietnamese american. i think thank you very much for all the time you have served in vietnam and now as well.

i would like to come back to one question i have a chance to ask you last fall regarding the united nations conventions under the law of the sea. you had promised us at the time that you would vote for ratification of that. would you kindly update that? and i too also come into the second part of the -- regarding the unfair posture that china has exerted on the south china sea. two days from now on the may the 16th they're about to ban fishing in that whole area. 80% of the south china sea, from may until august. and that truly will affect a lot of billions of people living around that area with fisheries. and here i would like to come back to one statement just to thank you for your focus in asia and i would like to connect this with

the focus that president obama has somehow led us to pivot to asia. so that you and him somehow share the same, share the same interests for asia. so i would like to, in a way, defend the president with his tpp because of the level playing field, level playing field requirements that he put out. and i feel that is very much important for us to, by pushing the tpp forward, we need to observe that. thank you very much. >> well, i'm all in favor, as i said, of the partnership agreement. i want us to move forward with it as quickly as possible and place it as a high priority. i don't think the word pivot is the right word to use concerning our reemphasis or emphasis on our relations in

asia. because a lot of things are happening in that part of the world too. we don't want our european friends to think pivot means we're leaving one part of the world. by the way, the secretary of defense's credit she has not used the word pivot. it has been others that have. you covered a lot of ground but --? >> [inaudible]. >> the united nations. >> that is going to be, i think, again, it's up to, i have not heard the president utter one word that he wants the law of the sea treaty ratified. pardon me? >> [inaudible]. >> it has to do with presidential leadership t has to do with the president saying he wants the treaty passed by congress. there is not one word i have heard. second of all now it is probably going to be up to either the second obama administration or the romney administration as to whether that treaty is moved or not.

and that will be a decision, the leaders of congress follow the leadership to the president of the united states. we will see whether the incoming, romney administration, or the continuation of the obama administration is, places the law of the sea treaty as a priority. as you know it has been languishing for now for some 40 years or so. my dear friend john warner continues to come and see me and advocate for it. >> final question here. >> senator, i'm sorry. thank you very much. sorry. senator, fir first of all like to introduce myself. i'm eson muhammad with hi communications and i had the question that i wanted to know. why are we so focused on

iran if they are so far away from us? that is my question? >> well, i think we're worried about them developing missiles that can reach us. but, the iranians, well, they not only are developing nuclear weapons, we all know that. there is great debate how far along they are and what their real intentions are. they have enriched-uranium. they have taken other steps to further the development of nuclear weapons. but the iranians are also behaving badly throughout the world, including here in the united states of america. they had a plot to assassinate the south saudi ambassador here in washington, milano. too expensive for my states, i see why the saudi arabian

ambassador can afford to pick up the tab but the point is, actually, it is a very fine restaurant. [laughter] but, look, it's, only part of their activities is the effort to develop nuclear weapons. and this is my criticism. we need to look at iranian activities in their entirety. right now there are iranians on the ground in damascus though -- showing bashar al-assad regime how to kill people. there are iranian weapons coming into syria as well. unspeakable. iran is the country, this is the government when a young woman named netta was bleeding to death in the streets in tehran and 1 1/2 million people were demonstrating obama, obama, are you with us or are you with them in english, this administration refused to stand up for them, one of

the great mistakes in the 21st century in my view. i worry about iran ha is dedicated to the radical islamic agenda that -- what is wrong with that. if it means destroying, quote, wiping israel off the map then that's what is wrong with it, in my view. now there are some who may not find that, may just find that to be an idle threat. i don't, when a country dedicates itself to the proposition of wiping a neighbor, wiping a neighbor off of the map. i guess you and i have a very different view of the threat that iran poses to peace and stability in the world. i respect your obviously views and i hope you will respect my views on that issue. can i say i thank csis again for not only giving me the opportunity to maybe remarks but most importantly to have a exchange with some of the smartest people that i know

and so, thanks again and remember that the words of chairman mao who once said it is always darkest before it is totally black. thank you very much. [applause] . . [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

>> the u.s. senate convenes at 2 p.m. eastern today here live on c-span2. senators will begin work on legislation authorizing the export/import bank. at 4:30 the senate will consider two judicial nominations, and at 5:30 they'll vote on those nominations and on moving forward with the export/import bank bill. see live coverage of the senate here on c-span2. the house of representatives not in session today, but members are back tomorrow. they'll consider extending the violence against women act, and they'll vote on legislation setting defense policy for the next year. see the house live on our companion network, c-span. you're watching c-span2 with politics and public affairs. weekdays featuring live u.s. senate coverage, and every weekend the latest nonfiction authors and books on booktv. you can see past programs and get our schedules at our web site, and you can join in the conversation on social media sites.

saturdays this month c-span radio is airing more from the nixon tapes, secretly-recorded phone conversations from 1971 to 1973. this saturday at 6 p.m. eastern hear conversations between president nixon and white house special counsel and key adviser chuck coulson who passed away last month as they talk about the democratic presidential nominee, george mcgovern. >> mr. president, he really is -- >> you don't think so? >> i think he realizes he's on the verge of an impending disaster, and everything he's done -- >> in washington, d.c. listen at 90.1 fm. nationwide we're on xm channel 119 and streaming at c-span radio.org. today, president obama will deliver the commencement address at barnard college in new york

city, and you can see it live on our companion network, c-span. again, starting at 1:10 eastern. and later this afternoon on c-span be former undersecretary of state nicholas burns is speak being at the atlantic council about his ideas for strengthening nato and u.s./europe relations. that starts at 4 eastern, live on c-span. nato leaders will meet next week in chicago. the senate foreign relations committee last week held a hearing on that summit. the pent gob's assistant secretary for european affairs and the deputy assistant secretary for nato both testified. senator john kerry chaired the two-and-a-half hour hearing. >> the hearing will come to order. thank you all very much for being here this morning. i apologize if we're starting a

moment late or two. by way of process, i have a conflict about 10:30, about 10:25. senator shaheen who is the chairman of the european affairs subcommittee will chair the, chair the hearing from that point forward. um, and i appreciate everybody's understanding of that. yesterday the committee had the opportunity to have very healthy and broad discussion with secretary general rasmussen, and he laid out for us the general expectations of the summit and the road forward as we continue to really define this new role and the new parameters of nato. this was our fourth hearing on

nato since 2009, and it's not an accident that we are having it now. i think all the members of the committee share the belief that the alliance remains vital to american security, and its effectiveness as an institution deserves our continued focus and attention. but, needless to say, that focus has changed. europe has changed. the world has changed. and later this month when the allies meet in chicago to discuss its future in afghanistan and elsewhere, a lot of that redefining will be on the table. so this summit is about how do you make nato stronger and how do we learn from our shared experiences. in my judgment nato is, and i think this is a shared judgment, a fundamental element of our national security and the nation demands critical analysis in

order to meet the evolving threats of our national security. one thing is pretty clear about nato. it has already confounded its skeptics. from boss any ca and -- bosnia and kosovo, from afghanistan to libya, the alliance has demonstrated an ability to adapt to the post-cold war security environment. obviously, we've had our challenges in both afghanistan and libya, but we have learned from them. the signing of the strategic partnership agreement by president obama last week signaled the gradual transition from a war-fighting posture to a supportive role, and nato's commitment to the people of libya in the past year has shown that the alliance, properly leveraged, is still a very highly-responsive, capable and legitimate tool when it really matters. i don't want to spend too much time on the full agenda in which the members are going to, are

engaged. including strengthening partnerships with countries and organizations around the globe, defending against terrorism and cyber threats and deploying defenses against the real missile threats that the alliance faces. each will get, i'm sure, some further attention in the course of the hearing today. but let me just make a couple of broader points. first, on afghanistan and then, second, on meeting our security needs in the age of austerity. recently, just literally a day before the president arrived in afghanistan, i was there for two days for discussions with ambassador crocker, the head of the u.s. forces, general allen, i met with president karzai, his cabinet members and with the head of the u.n. mission in afghanistan. i also visited with civil

society members, with potential presidential candidates and parties. to a person, everyone emphatically stated that the completion of this agreement is something of a game changer. and over the years that i've traveled to afghanistan and the region, i think about 18 times since 9/11 events, i've had many conversations with people at all different levels there in the high points and the low points of the conflict. and i don't think -- i think i can confidently say that i've never sensed quite a collective sense of direction or sigh of relief as a consequence of that agreement. but i will say definitively, and i said this to president karzai, that in the end our gains are going to mean nothing if we lose sight of three major challenges

that remain. one is the continued challenge of governance, the challenge of corruption within a government process and the delivery of services. that is paramount. two is the question of the continued danger of a sanctuary war being prosecuted against the forces there. i am a veteran of the sanctuary war, and i know how insidious it can be, and i personally think it is simply unacceptable to have a zone of immunity for acts of war against armed forces and against the collective community that is trying to accomplish what it is trying to accomplish. that means pakistan has to become more assertive and more cooperative, and we may have to resort to other kinds of self-help depending on what they decide to do. and the final point that i think everything hangs on -- and, again, i underscored this as

powerfully as i could in having been involved in trying to sort of dig our way out of the problems of the 2009 election -- we must prepare now for the election process. not later, but now. it is imperative that the afghan government through an independent election commission put out the rules of the road for that election. the lists have to be prepared, the registration has to take place, there has to be openness, transparency, accountability, free and fair elections are mandatory to any chance to go forward after 2014 with any possibility of success. so those three things leap out at the nato challenge as we go forward here. and finally, the second point. the alliance can only endure if there is a shared sacrifice and a shared commitment to the common purpose. we talked yesterday with

secretary general rasmussen about this, the failure of some countries to muster their 2% contributions and the expectations going forward really raise serious questions still as we define the road ahead. so we need to work with our european friends. we all understand this is a time of austerity. it's a time of austerity for everybody, but we're going to have to set priorities, we're going to have to decide what's really important and what's, perhaps, less important. and while we all understand that military budgets may not be inviable with the respect to the austerity, certain priorities have to stand out, and i believe the mutuality of this defense is one of those. and we need to make that real. so we have to be clear that even before the financial crisis nato was seriously underfunded, and as we emerge from the financial

crisis, we've all got to commit the resources necessary for the core security interests. finally, i'll put the remainder of the comments in the record as if read in full, but i just say in the end i'm delighted to have the panels that we have here today. we couldn't have a better group of experts of varying views to share our thinking about this important topic, and on the first panel we have dr. philip gordon, european/eurasian affairs. dr. jamestown sepped, the deputy secretary of defense, and on the second panel, dr. charles kupchan, professor of international affairs at georgetown university, and whitney shepherd zahn and ian brzezinski, and dr. hasn't binnendijk at the national

defense university, so we're grateful for all of you today for taking time to be here and look forward to your testimony. senator corker. might i say that senator lugar has asked that his comments be placed in the record, and they will be appropriately and, senator corker, i recognize you. >> [inaudible] >> yemen, we look forward to your testimony -- gentlemen, we look forward to your testimony. thank you. >> thank you, senator kerry, for inviting us here to testify on the nato summit which the united states is proud to be hosting in chicago on may 20th and 21st. with your permission, senator, i'd like to submit my full statement for the record -- >> we appreciate that, and without objection, the full statement will be in the record. >> thank you. i want to say i appreciate the committee's support for this summit as well as its sustained recognition of this alliance transatlantic security. this ag summit will be the first summit on american soil in the 13 years and the first ever

outside of washington. in addition to the opportunity to showcase one of our nation's great cities, our hosting of the summit in chicago is a tangible symbol of the importance of nato to the united states. it is also an opportunity to underscore to the american people the continued value of this alliance to security challenges we face today. in nato's last summit in lisbon nearly 18 months ago, the allies unveiled a new strategic concept that defines nato's focus in the 21st century. building on the decisions taken in the lisbon, the allies have three objectives for the chicago summit; afghanistan capabilities and partnerships -- and if i might, i'd like to just say a few words about each. on afghanistan, the isaf coalition has made significant progress in reeventing that country from serving as a safe haven for to havists and -- terrorists and insuring that afghans can provide for their own security. these are both necessary conditions to fulfill the president's goal to disrupt, dismantle and defeat be

al-qaeda. last week as the chairman acknowledged, the united states demonstrated its commitment to the long-term stability and security of afghanistan when president obama and president karzai signed the strategic partnership agreement. and, again, i appreciated hearing chairman kerry's assessment and look forward to discussing afghanistan further. at chicago where afghanistan is concerned, the united states anticipates three deliverables in particular; an agreement on an interim milestone in 2013 when isaf's mission will shift from combat to support for the afghan national security forces, the nsf; secondly, an agreement on the size, cost and sustainment of the ansf beyond 2014 and, finally, a road map for nato's post-2014 role in afghanistan. regarding capabilities, nato's ability to deploy an effective fighting force in the field makes the alliance unique. however, its capacity to deter

and respond to security challenges will only be as successful as its forces are available, effective, interoperable and modern. in the current era of fiscal austerity, nato can still maintain a strong defense but doing so requires innovation, creativity and effectiveness. the united states is modernizing its presence in europe at the same time that our nato allies and nato as an institution are engaged in this similar steps. this is a clear opportunity, i might even say necessity, for our european allies to take on greater responsibilities. the united states continues to strongly urge those allies to meet the 2% benchmark for defense spending and to contribute politically, financially and operationally to the strength to the alliance. of the alliance. in addition, we should also focus on how these resources are allocated and for what priorities. nato has made progress towards pooling more national resources which is exemplified through the capabilities package that the

united states anticipates that leaders will endorse in chicago. this package for chicago includes missile defense, the alliance ground surveillance program and baltic air policing. allies are, further more, expected to endorse the ddpr. the ddpr will identify the appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional and missile defense capabilities that nato needs to meet 21st century security challenges as well as reaffirm making consensus decisions on alliance posture issues. finally, the chicago summit will highlight nato's success in working with a growing number of partners around the world. effective partnerships allow the alliance to extend its reach, act with greater legitimacy, share burdens and benefit from the capabilities of others. allies will not take decisions on further enlargement of nato in chicago, but they will, nonetheless, send a clear, positive message to aspirant countries in support of their

membership goals. the united states has been clear that nato's door remains open to european democracies that are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of mitch. boss -- membership. bosnia, montenegro and georgia are all working closely with allies to meet criteria. let me talk briefly about two aspirants that i know are of particular interest to this committee, macedonia and georgia. macedonia's fulfilled key cry criteria required and has contributed to regional and global security. the united states fully supports the u.n. process led by ambassador matt nimitz, we also engage with both greece and macedonia to find a solution to the name dispute which will fulfill the decision taken at nato's summit in bucharest and extend the membership offer to macedonia. with regard to georgia, u.s. security assistance and military engagement support the country's defense reform, train troops for

isaf operations and advance nato operability. in january president obama and georgia's president agreed to enhance this cooperation to advance georgia's military modernization and self-defense capabilities. u.s. assistance programs provide additional support to ongoing democratic and economic reform efforts in georgia, a critical part of georgia's euro-atlantic aspirations. u.s. support for georgia eastertorial integrity within its internationally-recognized borders remain steadfast and our nonrecognition of separatist regions will not change. finally, let me address russia's -- nato's relationship with russia. 2012 marks the 15th anniversary of the nato-russia founding act and the tenth an verse of the russia council, commemorate inside a meeting in the brussels last month. the nrc is founded on the need to address issues of mutual

agreement. the best example of cooperation is our joint efforts in afghanistan where russia's transit support has been critical to the mission's success. at the same time, nato continues to seek cooperation with russia on missile defense in order to enhance our capabilities to counter this threat. we have also been frank in our discussions with russia that we will continue to develop and deploy our missile defensesser respect i irrespective of the status with russia. nato is not a threat to russia, nor is russia a threat to nato. it's no secret there are issues in which we differ. we also disagree fundamentally over the situation in georgia. since 2008 nato has strongly supported georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity and has continued to urge russia to meet its commitments with respect to georgia. in conclusion, the three summit priorities that i just outlined demonstrate how far nato's evolved since its founding six

decades ago. the reasons for its continued success are clear. the alliance has over the last 63 years proven to be an adaptable, durable and cost effective provider of security. when president obama welcomes his counterparts to chicago in just over a week, the united states will be prepared to work with our allies and partners to insure that the alliance remains vibrant and capable for many more years to come. thank you very much, and i look forward to your questions. >> thank you, mr. secretary. we appreciate it. secretary townsend. >> chairman kerry and members of the committee, thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the nato summit which the united states will host in chicago in may. i will describe for the committee what we hope to achieve at the summit from a defense point of view and its relevance for u.s. national security. i particularly look forward to hearing the committee's views on the summit and the priorities you have for its outcome. i'd like to summarize my

statement, mr. chairman, and submit the full statement for the record. >> without objection. >> nato heads of state and government come together at a summit every few years not only to approve important pieces of alliance business, but also to renew at the highest level the commitment allies have made to one another in the north atlantic treaty. be this commitment -- this commitment to come to one another's defense as expressed in article v of the treaty is a solemn one that has only been invoked once after the united states was attacked on september 11th, 2001. this commitment was critical during the cold war to help deter the soviet union and the warsaw pact from attacking the united states and our allies. even with the end of the cold war, this article v commitment remains the core of the alliance. nato serves as the organizing framework to insure that we have allies willing and able to fight

alongside us in conflict and provide an integrated military structure that puts the military teeth behind alliance political decisions to take action. in addition to insuring the interoperability of our allies, nato serves as a hub and an integrator of a network of global security partners. the nato air and maritime operation in libya illustrate this point. the operation began as a coalition of the willing involving the united states, the united kingdom and france. however, when nato answered the u.n.'s call to protect the libyan people, it was able to take on the mission and execute it successfully. had nato not been there or had nato been too weak an institution to take on such an operation, the coalition would have had to carry on alone.

keeping nato strong both politically and militarily is critical to insure nato is ready when it is needed. this has been true for the past 20 years when the turbulence of the international system has demanded that nato respond nearly continuously to crises throughout the globe. today, for example, nato forces are in afghanistan, in the balkans, carrying pirates in the waters off somalia and have just concluded operations in libya. looking out into the future, challenges to the united states and our allies can come from ballistic missile proliferation, cyber attack, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction as well as from just the instability that we can see happening as turmoil takes place as nations wrestle to set up their forms of government. we must be ready to meet emerging threats. we would prefer to meet these

challenges together with allies and not alone. so the strategic context for the summit is what i've just described, and for our work at nato every day, this is what we have in mind: how can we keep nato and the allies ready and able to meet the challenges of today and in the future? this is especially complex today as the european economic crisis compels allies to cut defense spending and force structure in order to reduce their debt and decrease government spending. allies, too, have different views and priorities regarding perceptions of the threat and the traditions of their own military forces. not every ally sees the world and their role in it the way we do. but one thing we all agree on is that we need the alliance to be unified and strong. allies look to the united states

to lead the way in keeping nato strong, capable and credible. that is where we come to the summit in chicago. at chicago heads of state and government will agree or prove work that we committed to at the last summit at lisbon 18 months ago. at chicago this work will focus on three areas; an agreement on a strategic plan for afghanistan, military capabilities and nato partnerships. the united states has three summit objectives. number one is charting a clear path for the completion of transition and reaffirming nato's commitment to the long-term security of afghanistan. the second objective, maintaining nato's core defense capabilities during this period of austerity and building a force ready for future challenges. and finally, deepening the engagement of nato's partner nations in if alliance operations and activities.

chairman, i'd like to conclude my summary here, and i welcome your questions and look forward to a good discussion. >> well, thanks very much, secretary townsend. we will have that, i am sure. let me ask you quickly if i can before i turn the gavel over, um, secretary gordon, first of all, what's the reaction of the europeans generally to the obama administration's decision to take two of the four combat brigades out -- army brigades out of europe? and what's the impact? in i mean, how is that going to effect -- >> no, i appreciate the opportunity to address that because i think we have been quite successful in the explaining, actually, what is behind that thinking. i was, actually, in berlin, lithuania and copenhagen the week we announced it and had an opportunity to explain the thinking behind it.

it is a misunderstanding to even think about it in terms of withdrawal from europe. that was the initial concern that people would be imagining that somehow we were reducing our presence in europe. the fact is those brigade combat teams that you're referring to have been fighting in southwest asia for the past decade, and the issue that the defense department was addressing in rethinking our force presence in europe was after this decade of heavy presence, of spending hundreds of billions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of troops in iraq and afghanistan, what was the right posture moving forward, especially at a time of fiscal constraint? and we have had the opportunity to explain this thinking to our european allies, that we remain absolute committed to europe and to article v, and moving forward even after those brigade combat teams do not return to their original homes in germany, europe will have at least as many u.s. forces as it has had

for the past decade during which we believe that article v has been credible, and we've absolutely had an ability to defend europe. we have also, and the pentagon is working this out as we speak, taken the decision to insure that elements of those brigade combat teams rotate through europe to insure the critical partnership function that they performed while they were there. so whereas there may have been some initial concern that the headline of withdrawing troops in europe will dominate, we think that by actually explaining what is behind this thinking and reiterating our commitment to europe which, by the way, should not be -- i'll end with this -- should not be reduced to the number of brigade combat teams in europe. over the three years of the obama administration, we have done a number of other things to modernize and reiterate our commitment to europe, including deploying missile defense, which will mean american presence

including troops, people in romania and poland, radar in turkey. we're rotating aegis cruisers which will home port in spain, so there's actually a whole web of new american presence in europe. we've moved forward on an aviation detachment in poland, we've done some other things with special forces in the u.k. and elsewhere. so we've also tried to remind them that america's commitment to europe and america's presence in europe should not be reduced to the number of brigade combats -- >> can you give me a quick take because i have one other question i want to ask, can you give me a quick take on president-elect's hollande promise to withdraw forces by the end of this year and the impact of that on the entire collective effort? >> absolutely. president -- as you know, the lisbon commitment, the lisbon timetable, one of the things we were most successful in lisbon was getting everyone on the same

page for the 2014 timetable. our core principle has been in together, out together, and in the lisbon the alliance as a whole, isaf as a whole agreed that combat troops would remain performing their mission being successful until the end of 2014. francois hollande took the position that french troops should be out by the end of 2012, and this is obviously something we will look forward to discussing with the president once he is sworn in. in fact, i leave for paris this afternoon to carry on with this conversation which has already begun. we've been in touch with them as you would expect in recent days and weeks. the french assure us that they are committed to our common success in afghanistan, and i'm sure we'll find a way forward that insures that common success. all i can do is speak to our own view which is that this principle of in together, out together remains critical, and we should also not lose sight of

the fact -- which i think is quite an accomplishment for the president and his leadership of this alliance -- that every single member of isaf has stuck to that. and there haven't been the withdrawals notwithstanding the economic crisis that we know is painful, not withstanding the domestic political pressures. every member of isaf is onboard for maintaining that commitment to the end of 2014. >> well, those will be interesting discussions, obviously. i was just sitting here thinking you have the toughest job of all, having to travel to these difficult capitals of london and brussels and paris, so forth -- >> i made clear -- >> you don't have to comment. [laughter] >> i started, i made clear to secretary clinton that i am ready to spend as much time as necessary in paris in the coming weeks. >> fair enough. fair enough. final question just quickly. almost a year ago now secretary gates made a very strong statement to the alliance in which he lamented, quote: that many of the allies are unwilling

to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their own defense. where does the administration stand with respect to that statement today, and what can we hope for? >> mr. chairman, as i underscored in my statement, we continue to urge our european partners to uphold their responsibilities in the areas of defense including the common pledge of 2% spending on defense. it is a reality that long-term european defense trends, the trend of european defense spending is poor, and in the long run if it's not sustained, the alliance won't be able to do what we have so successfully done for so many years and decades including most recently in libya where notwithstanding the real constraints we face, the european allies were able to step up. they flew more than 85% of the strike missions in libya, they made a critically important contribution in libya. in afghanistan they've sustained

nearly 30,000 troops as part of isaf for almost a decade. in these and other cases we want more and need more, but we shouldn't overlook the fact that they're making critically important contributions. we are constantly urging them to make the investments necessary so that that will be true in five years from now just as it is true today. last thing, we understand the constraints. that is why one of the deliver bls for chicago that both jim and i have emphasized is this question of capabilities and smart defense. even if we sustain levels, we have to do it better, more efficiently, and we have some particular projects that we'd be happy to talk about that will actually show the alliance moving forward in pooling and sharing and spending more wisely with the limited resources that are available. >> well, i appreciate it. there are, obviously, some follow ups to that, and secretary townsend, i'm sure you have a point of view on it, so we'll leave the record open for a week after this, and we'll try not to burden you with too much, but there may be some things we

want to do to fill it out. i will now recognize senator corker, and i'll turn the gavel over to senator shaheen. thank you. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you both for your testimony. you know, we've been, this issue of the 2%gdp commitment that's not being honored is something that's been talked about for a long time. secretary albright was in not maybe two years ago talking about the same thing, secretary gates has been in talking about the same thing and certainly did so in europe. and we talked yesterday with the secretary general about this same issue, and it continues to be, well, we're urging. i do think it's a huge problem, and this trend's been continuing for a long time. we understand europe is under stress right now, but what set of ingredients do you think exist or what is it that we're doing? you know, we spent last year a little bit over 5% of gdp here on defense, and i'm glad that we did. i know it's drop dropping to the

high 4s in this next year, and certainly i think we should make sure we invest appropriately in that regard, but as we continue to do what we're doing, we almost become the provider of security services, and they more and more becoming the consumer of security services. and it doesn't, that doesn't seem to be anything that's really changing that dynamic. i know there's been commitments in afghanistan and on a per capita basis many of the countries have actually had more casualties than us. and we honor that. but from the standpoint of year in, year out investment in modernization and defense forces, it's just not happening. and we've been talking this same line since i've been here. i've been here five years now, and nothing has changed. matter of fact, it's moving in the other direction. there are only three countries today, us, the u.k. and, believe it or not, greece, of all, of the entire alliance that is investing 2%. a lot of people are saying

greece's investment is not being done wisely, or at least that's what we heard yesterday. but i just wonder if there's anything that you would tell us that other than urging, anything that's going to really change that dynamic and cause this to be a true alliance and not one of us, again, providing security services and them being the consumers. >> again, i'll start and jim will, may want to jump in on this. first of all, senator, we agree with that assessment, and that's why as i say we've been clear in making similar comments to our european allies about how critical this is. i would again recall libya as an example of doing more than urging where the case of libya facing a grave humanitarian crisis, situation of a dictator using violence of hi own people and european allies coming to us and telling us how important it was for us to act, the arab league calling for intervention as well, we went to the

europeans in that case and said, we agree, action needs to be taken. we took the lead, got a u.n. security council resolution and said we're prepared to do -- >> let me focus in, i appreciate and honor that, too, but, you know, to build a, an appropriate defense mechanism as a group of countries, it takes year in, year out, year in, year out investment. i mean, just as we see right now with sequestration here. i mean, the pentagon's already beginning to be concerned about the future because their horizon is not just in a month, but it's over a long period of time. and i think what we're seeing in europe is over a long period of time a very downward trajectory. and so i honor what happened in libya, but i'm still not seeing anything whatsoever that's changing the trend to move it back up to, by the way, what is a commitment. i mean, this is not like a goal, a 2% investment of gdp is an absolute commitment by the nato

allies. it's not being honored. and so, you know, what i'm concerned about is the long-run trajectory, and that's what we're not seeing. and i'm just wondering, again, what set of ingredients is going to change that especially with the economic times we're dealing with. >> once again, senator, agree with that assessment. the point i was going to make about libya is not just in the short term, but actually dresses the longer-term point. in that case we said we will provide our unique capabilities, but we expect you to be able to play a major role yourselves. and by insisting on that, we got them to do it in that case and are now able to say, well, the example. if you don't continue to invest in the advanced fighter planes and precision-guided munitions and the intelligence assets, then you won't be able to do this in the future, and you can't expect the united states to do it for you. that's something, obviously, only they can make those decisions, but that's what they're hearing from us, and we also referred to our

capabilities deliverables for chicago, trying to finally -- there's a lot of inefficiencies in alliance when it comes to defense spending. there's redundancies, and people aren't doing it -- if i might -- smartly enough. and the agreement among nato companies to build this allied ground surveillance system where 13 of them will come together and buy five drones built by an american company, by the way, to be able to share all this through the entire alliance is the sort of thing they need to be investing in unless they're going to have enough money for all of them to buy individual drones which is not realistic. this is the sort of thing that they can do with less money to actually provide a capability for everybody. so we're trying to do that as well. >> well, thank you, and i'm glad we're on the same page here. let me ask another question. when are we -- this commitment to afghanistan, last i checked and i'm a little dated on this, but to provide enough resources for them just to maintain the security forces that we have trained up with them, i think,

is about nine billion a year if i remember correctly. y'all might correct me. i think the budget authority last time i checked in afghanistan and, again, i'm a little dated, but it was around, you know, a billion, ball and a half, two billion, so there's a huge gap, and that's for the entire government, okay? what is the entire security tab, and what kind of commitments -- because this is something that's coming up, like, right now, this is not a trajectory, these are commitments we need to make -- what is the exact gap, and when do we expect from our nato allies to have those real pledges coming forth to fill that gap? >> um, we'll have to get you the exact number on where we are right now -- >> i think i'm on the order of magnitude. >> right. where we are focused on where this is concerned for chicago, obviously, this number needs to go down. none of us want to or intend to, i think your order of magnitude

is about right on where we are and have been for the past couple of years. none of us want to keep spending that amount years into the future, and that's why we are focused on how to leave something sustainable in our wake. once afghans are fully in charge of their security, we want it to work, but we know we're going to have to help. and the plan that we're looking at for chicago would involve the international community putting in around $4 billion a year to maintain the afghan national security forces. for up to a decade. now, the afghans themselves have already pledged $50 million a year of their own $500 million a year of their own money and that amount should rise year by year after that, and secretary gates challenged the rest of isaf to come up with a billion euros per year, so about $1.3 billion of that $4.1 billion total. and we have been working very hard at the highest levels of our government to get the rest

of the international community to deliver on that pledge so that if we get to that point of the $4.1 billion, the afghans would be doing half a billion, the other members of isaf would be doing at least 1.3 billion be, that would bring our numbers down, obviously, considerably and by a factor of, you know, five or six or more. >> and you think you may get those commitments in chicago? is that what you're saying? or is that going to take a much longer period of time? >> we are looking to get as solid a political commitment from as many countries as possible, and i think it's fair to say we're making good progress towards that goal. >> are well, thank you for your work and, madam chairman, thank you. >> senator cardin. >> madam chair, thank you very much, and let me thank our witnesses. secretary gordon, i want to follow up on a point that i talked to the secretary general rasmussen about yesterday. and that is, the chicago summit will not be an enlargement summit, and i got the secretary

general's view on how we deal with the as perhaps nation -- aspirant nations that one day we hope will be part of nato. and i want to start off with my concern. it's been that ability or desire to join either the european union or nato that has been a motivating factor to accelerate democratic reforms in many countries of europe. and we've seen that work very successfully. i think there must be some disappointment that the summit will not be an enlargement summit. montenegro and macedonia were very close to moving forward on their plans. we have the issues with bosnia where they've made some significant progress and have not quite met the target dates, but they are moving forward in a very positive way. georgia has also made substantial progress, and i understand they may not have reached the plateau for formal

acceptance, but i think the signal that's being sent is that we're slowing down the formal expansion of nato for many reasons and many legitimate reasons. on a parallel path, the eu. has been -- e.u. has been very slow on expansion because of the economic problems of europe. so i guess i would like to get the administration's view as to how we continue to keep the momentum moving towards democratic reform and ultimate membership in nato in countries that we have been very actively engaged, the four i mentioned plus others? >> thank you, senator. first point is absolutely agree that historically nato enlargement has been good for nato, good for europe and good for those countries. as you said, it has contributed to democracy in europe and stability and has been absolutely the right policy, and administrations of different stripes have all been strongly supportive of it.

we completely agree with that. i think we have been saying, you know, in this phrase that you heard with rasmussen, not an enlargement summit, we have been saying, okay, it's not an enlargement summit, but it's also not a summit that should be backing away from enlargement. so there is not a country ready to be include inside the alliance at this summit, so in that sense it's not an enlargement summit, but we want to be clear this doesn't mean we're not as supportive as ever of the open-door policy. one of the ways we're going to signal that is secretary clinton will participate in a meeting of nato foreign ministers with the four aspirant countries to specifically acknowledge them, note that the door remains open and talk to them about the process going forward, and we hope and expect that the communique will also signal our strong support for enlargement in general and the processes of these four aspirants in particular. the only reason that none are

joining at this summit, i think you'd also agree that every case needs to be done through treated separately, and we should have high standards and important be criteria for joining the alliance, and we continue to work in different ways with each of the four countries you mentioned. i'd be happy to talk in more detail about where we are in each, but our bottom line is no one should see the summit as somehow the end of enlargement or different priority. we remain committed to the open door. >> and i accept that, and i agree with you each of the four countries are truly unique, and i understand the hurdles that each of the four countries still have remaining. i really do. i think, though, that it's very important the signal that's given. the types of reforms that are being carried out not just in these four countries, but others who would like to become one day candidates or a plan for entering nato are not necessarily popular locally. the type of commitments to the defense, the type of commitments

to their constitutional chains for authority, the type of democratic reforms that we see, the type of controls necessary for security. those type of issues aren't always the most popular domestically in those countries. but they're able to do it because they see a path towards integration. if that path look like it's going to be a long haul as seen in the recent european elections countries don't -- populists don't always go the responsible route. so i think it's very important that the message come from the united states. clearly, i'm pleased secretary clinton will be talking to the four aspirant countries. i be i think it's clear -- we have to be very clear that we do want integration, and we do see the path that will lead to that and that there are reforms that need to be pursued, and although we've -- we're not ready at this summit, we do anticipate there will be enlargement, and we do

encourage countries to seek membership in europe and in nato. >> we agree with that for the very reasons you state, and it is our goal and commitment to make sure that this summit sends a signal, a positive signal in that direction. i'll be honest, not every member of nato is enthusiastic about the enlargement process, and sometimes it takes some persuading to make sure that that positive signal gets sent, but it certainly is this administration's view, and we appreciate the support of this committee for that goal. >> and we've seen that at prior summits, the exact points that you've raised. i know there's concerns about other countries in europe and their view about nato enlargement. we're well aware of all those different issues, and that's why i think it's particularly important for u.s. leadership to be pretty focused and clear in chicago. thank you, madam chair. >> senator rich. senator risch. >> thank you, madam chairman and, thank you, gentlemen, for

coming. as you probably know, the committee met with the secretary general yesterday, and we had a spirited conversation along the lines that senator cardin raised on enlargement, and i'd like to associate myself with his remarks. i think all of us have the same concerns that he does and want to make certain that the communication is clear that wanting to join is one thing, a strong commitment to the requirements for joining is another issue that, certainly, needs to be underscored. let me say that, secretary gordon, you've correctly identified, i think, the issues that this committee's interested in, and i want to talk about just one of those briefly, and that is the georgia situation. it is a concern to a lot of us, and as far as the -- in your remarks you talked about the stress, the stressing that you did to the russians about meeting their commitments as far as georgia's concerned. and you touched on it kind of lightly, and i don't mean that

derogatorily. it's, it's almost as if international community understands the commitments that the russians have made regarding georgia, but no one really expects them to meet those commitments. and as i kind of read between the lines with what you were saying, it was almost a reiteration of that. and it's unfortunate, but give me your thoughts on whether russia's going to meet it commitments. i mean, they made very strong commitments they're -- excuse me be, not strong commitments, clear commitments as to what they were and weren't going to do to the french. and the one that i'm most interested in is the obligation to vacate occupied territories. it's just not right. the russians said they weren't going to -- that they would meet the commitment to vacate. they haven't done that. and from what i can tell, nobody really expects them to do that. what are your thoughts on that regard? >> thank you, senator. i won't pretend it is easy to

find a way to get russia to meet those commitments. we completely agree with your assessment that russia is currently in violation of the ceasefire agreements that were reached in august and september of 2008. they had six points, and one of them was for russian troops to go back to where they were prior to the start of the conflict, and those troops are not currently back to where they were prior to the start of the conflict. we believe, therefore, like you, that russia's in violation of those commitments, and we've also been clear, and secretary clinton has referred to russia's occupation of georgia -- not meant to be provocative, but to simply describe what we believe to be the case, which is russia having military forces within the territory y'all boundaries of an internationally-recognized country. we have been very active in preventing any further recognitions of south i sed ya which is, of course, what russia did.

i think there are maybe three other countries in the world that have done so, and every single other member of the international community has refused to do so. in that sense we believe we have denied russia any legitimization that they have tried to have over south ossetia and abkhazia. we've also maintained not just rhetorically support for georgian sovereign integrity, but genuine support for the country of georgia. most recently manifested in the visit that saakashvili paid to president obama in the oval office where we committed to strengthening the economic relationship and the defense relationship, and i'll take the opportunity to express appreciation for the contributions georgia has made in afghanistan where they're one of the leading troop contributors, certainly per capita. and we're working to strengthen that defense relationship as well. >> and i think we've all done

likewise in expressing that appreciation. but i have to tell you it's disheartening to sit here and watch this sort of thing where a commitment is made like this, and it's just handled cavalierly by the international community. nobody does anything about it, and it's just, it's disheartening to say the least. mr. townsend, i want to follow up on comments that senator corker made, and if you feel comfortable in answering these, fine. if not, we can go back to mr. gordon. but it has to do with the sustainability of the ansf forces. you know, those of us who deal with this regularly when you put a pencil to this, it just doesn't work. and i know the, ec tear gordon -- secretary gordon, in fact, i think he listed it as the number one priority for the chicago meeting was to chart a clear path forward for security forces in afghanistan for sustainability.

and, um, i understand you want the money that you want from the europeans and from others, but when you look at what it costs to maintain the ansf, i mean, it -- and you compare it to the gdp of the country, even if you can quote the drug profits that they make, they just don't work. so what are your thoughts on that? how do you get there? how do you get some confidence in being able to do this when the numbers just don't work? >> thank you, senator. your -- the pencil work you described is, i'm sure, being done on the hill, it's being done by the administration as well i know my department, as well as the department of state we're working those numbers as well at nato, too, with allies, with the afghan government. it's a, a lot of pencils going about trying to determine as we chart the way forward between now and 2014 and post-2014 whether you're at nato and

you're looking at what the nato presence could be, whether you're looking at the u.s. side of it on a bilateral basis, the afghan side. what we have to figure first is what do we think we're going to need in terms of the ansf to do the job after 2014? what needs to be, what needs to be some of the factors that we look at? and i think one of the major factors driving the size of the ansf which is, of course, part of what drives the number will be conditions on the ground, the type of job the ansf will face after 2014, what will the taliban look like. these are all right now unknown factors. we feel that we've got a pretty good feeling for what we think could happen, but so much depends on how much we're able to degrade the taliban. and so that presents less of a threat to afghanistan and less of a threat to the ansf. that certainly impacts the size. we know as senator kerry talked about there's a very important election coming up in 201, what

will be the requirements there in terms of security and making sure that that election goes off without a security threat. so the pencils are moving, and we're still in the middle of that work. at chicago nato is going to produce its strategic plan for afghanistan where it will be trying to deal with what these numbers and describe what the nato presence is going to look like. as you know, we just signed, also, the u.s., um, strategic partnership agreement with the afghans. and so we're right now putting down on paper the structure of what we think we're going to be doing. that will impact what the ansf will look like and that, in turn, will have the cost figure there. and so we know we've got a tall job ahead, but we know, too, that we've got to make sure that the afghans have what they, what we think they're going to need to do the job, and we're in the middle of doing that now. ..

>> i want to get into some of the specifics of the upcoming summit but before he do that and want to ask you about some news that broke this morning around the decision in russia that newly inaugurated president putin is not going to come to the g8 summit next week, and i wonder if what we think about this decision by mr. putin, if that comes as a surprise, and more generally, how is his return to the presidency going

to affect nato russian relations? >> i'm happy to address the narrower question of the g8. this summit -- about your relations president putin called president obama yesterday to first have an exchange on the anniversary of victory day but more specifically, to one, let them know that we look forward to continuing out that this was the first time they had spoken since he was inaugurated, look forward to continuing the relationship but given the responsibility of moscow having just been a not great of trying to put a cabinet together he fell it was important to stay there and instead would send former president now prime minister medvedev to the g8 summit, and instead suggested that they -- the two presidents meet at the next g20 meeting which is some five weeks from today. so that is that, and the president will look forward to seeing prime minister medvedev

at the g8 and will look forward to seeing president putin at the g20. in terms of the broader relationship, as you know, we have been very proud of what we have been able to accomplish with russia over the past two years. the very straightforward basis that we have a lot of interests in common and whereas we have some significant differences as well and i was just talking about one with regard to georgia. the president felt it was in our national interest to pursue those areas of cooperation where we could while agreeing to disagree and standing for our principles elsewhere. as you know, we have done that. the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty agreement on transit in afghanistan, the 123 civil mcleer agreement, russian support in the security council resolutions on iran, most recently rushed his agreement to join the wto which included the bilateral economic trita -- treaty in georgia. this is the basis for cooperation with russia and so

your question is, how did that continue with president putin? we will see. i can only speak from our and that we are determined to pursue the same practical policies we have all along in our own national interest. we look for areas of cooperation with russia. nobody can predict the future of what he can say however is that president putin, then prime minister putin, was around for every agreement that i just described and we managed to a great with him. so there is no reason to believe that even with those two gentlemen in different jobs, we won't be successful in continuing to reach practical areas of agreement when they are mutual. >> you so we really think we should get busy and there is no underlying ulterior motive here? >> i think only the russian government can -- we take at face value -- >> i should have clarified. that was a rhetorical question.

[laughter] stepping back a little bit from the specifics of the upcoming chicago summit, i want to talk about what we see as a nato member, the message is that people should take away from chicago. last month, i had the opportunity to host with the atlantic counsel and event around the upcoming summit. secretary albright and former senator warner were there, and it was very well attended. there was a lot of interest in it, and i think this summit comes at a very important time as we look at what has happened with nato, what is happening in europe right now. there have in some quarters than a suggestion that we should pull back from our commitments to nato, that the same is true in

europe as we look at the declining defense budgets which people have raised here today, and i actually think that would be a mistake if we look at our successes of nato and you both talked about those very eloquently in your opening remarks. this is a 60-year-old alliance and has been the most successful one in modern history anyway. you talked about the success in libya. we still represent three of the top for defense spending countries in the world, and we have, after a decade of fighting in afghanistan, the most experience fighting force that we have seen, again, in modern history. enlargement has been good for europe, so in view of where the alliance is now and in your view some of the criticisms and questions that have been raised about this ongoing potency to

deal with the challenges we face in the world today, what is the message that you all would like to see coming out of the chicago summit about nato and about our role in nato? i would like to ask actually both of you, if you could address that. >> well, madam chairman i couldn't agree more with your analysis and couldn't disagree more with the notion that maybe it's time to move on. and that you say beyond the particulars on afghanistan capability, think the overall message is that it is simply in the national security interest of the united states to strengthen our partnership with allies and whatever the drawbacks, deficiencies in defense spending or different points of view we may have on international questions, it is clearly in our interest to face the daunting challenges we face throughout -- around the world with a standing alliance of countries who broadly share our

values and interests. i just think that the case for doing that in some ways is greater than ever before, given the fiscal situation that we are all in. you just take any of the most recent examples but afghanistan is challenging enough. imagine trying to do it without this alliance, without the contributions of our partners, without an integrated military command structure in the tradition of military to cooperate with each other and some common assets like the awacs and the allied drone surveillance. it just doesn't make sense and again broadly speaking, european partners are those with which we manage global problems whether it's in the balkans, in libya, in afghanistan, or not any in a military sense but are negotiations in so many of the questions. i think it's just absolutely the case that it's in our interest to do this and libya is another very recent example.

i don't think anybody would have imagined us doing it military operation in libya back a couple of years ago. but to have a command-and-control system that is practiced in interoperable forces and a political body in brussels, because you can't just look these things up with the snap of a finger. you have to have the standing structure so i think that is the broad message and cooperation we would like to see. >> thank you mr. townsend would you like to do that? the senator thank you very much. i agree with everything that secretary gordon said and just a personal reflection, i've worked in the department of defense since the early 80s in various guises as well as the atlantic counsel and what i've seen over time, and when i answer this question to groups of americans, you know, when crisis happens, when going back so many years, the telephones rang in europe. they don't ring other places in terms of washington calling our

allies, calling nato's secretary-general. that is when the phone rings in the early days as we grapple with what to do. and it's something that is precious and it's something we haven't always had. if you look back in history, whether to the 1930s and watch how we as nations try to organize ourselves to deal with problems, the problems of those days and the differences of the problems today, we have a in nato and organizing entity to help us quickly come together just from a political basis at 28 around the table and kind of sort out, what do we need to do? we are able to go to the u.n. t a course of action. you have that nato won the military side integrated military structures that actually helps us to organize ourselves militarily and take action pretty quickly. assistant secretary gordon mentioned libya and i use libya

as well as an illustration on how we were able to come together politically, work with the united nations, work with the international community. not just with our european allies but broadly, and then take a course of action. it's a great test case of the theory, but i want to say in closing that, we have to always work at it. there'll always be critics and we need the critics because we need to understand where we are failing here and there, the lessons learned coming out of libya, the defense spending, the capabilities. i've worked for years with this, trying to keep moving forward and keep the alliance strong. it will never reach 100% in terms of fixing all the problems in getting it exactly right that we have to keep trying. i know assistant secretary gordon and i have worked many years on this together. we want to hand off to our successors and alliance that is continuing to move forward and continuing to look for ways to

get better. a lot of what the chicago summit is and the capabilities package particularly our ways in which we can try to ask -- address defense issues, address trying to spend money with the priority or ghost senator, some other senators have talked about prioritizing in the air of austerity. that is what we are going to try to do in chicago and every summit that comes around takes another step towards addressing these issues and becoming an even stronger alliance. >> thank you both very much. senator lee. >> thank you madam chair. thank you both for joining us. i'd like to start with mr. gordon. do you anticipate that over the next 10 days we might see any softening of turkey's objection to israel's participation in the upcoming summit? >> i think there are some misconception about this issue, but i actually appreciate the opportunity to clarify.

nato had not envisaged in fighting israel to the chicago summit. israel is an important partner of nato and certainly an important ally of the united states. it is a member of the predator in -- mediterranean dialogue. but the chicago summit was never going to have a meeting of every single one of those partnerships is simply a matter of logistics and time, so there was no, there was no meeting of the mediterranean dialogue or any provision to israel for turkey to belong. there are of course speculation is about this but that is just inaccurate. what is accurate, as you know very well, is the turkey is real relationship is fraught, which we deeply regret, with more positive aspects of the middle east incorporation between those two countries and we have invested an awful lot of diplomacy and overcoming that. we regret that heart worship at

nato with israel because of turkish objection and we have been very clear about that. no country should bring bilateral -- so it's a broad matter we are very focused on advancing as a specific matter for the nato summit it's not really an issue. >> so would you say that the relationship between turkey and israel doesn't vote well for the partnership such as it is between, between israel and nato? >> that is right, and as i say, the history of partnership activity in lots of countries in the mediterranean, we see it as a package and as i said first of all we don't accept that a country should bring any bilateral -- into the land and we don't accept countries can pick and choose in blocking partnership activity so our view is an ally operates by consensus. an ally is going to block partnership with one country and

we are not we are not going to accept partnership -- >> partnerships generally. >> partnerships generally and that is where we are now because we are not going to allow discrimination against the allied. >> but turkey's actions sort of jeopardize that understanding, right? they are challenging that assumption, that assertion? >> not the assertion that it's all or nothing. we have united states do everything by consensus, will not allow certain countries to be blocked and others to go ahead. >> but turkey nonetheless is objecting to any partnership activities that involve israel? >> correct. >> the mediterranean partnership or otherwise? >> correct. >> what are the administration's plans with regard to possible funding of afghan security forces at their peak of 350,000

troops beyond 2014? what can you tell us about that? >> well, as i think you know, you are right that the peak ansf will be around 350,000 traders but the longer term, what we believe the sustainable goal will be considerably less than that. closer to 230,000, because our principle guiding thinking about this all along is that they ansf needs to be sufficient to do the mission but also sustainable, which is to say affordable over the long-term. and that is where we think this remains, the issues to be discussed among allies in chicago and the work that needs to be done but we don't envisage that 380,000 will be sustained necessarily. we also acknowledge as a further response to senator risch's question earlier, and ansf can

do it by itself. the international committee will have to step up and play a role. ensuring that ansf are sustainable but it's also important to remember that whatever the international community will be far less than we have been paying every year for the last 10 years. >> okay, thank you. french president-elect francois hollande has indicated he would like to withdraw all french forces from afghanistan via the end of 2012. what do you think are the odds of that will actually occur? >> senator, i am not a betting man so establishing odds isn't going to be difficult, but you know, we have been in touch with the hollande team as they begin to take the reins of power. they are not there yet obviously

indian operation has got to come. i know secretary gordon told the committee he will be going to paris i think this afternoon to talk to the team. their shadow defense minister if you will, came by a month or two ago and i spoke with him a bed and listen to what he had to say. i think they say the situation of many politicians after an election, they are now going to be faced with governance. they are going to be faced with a summit where a lot of work has been done by the allies to try to make sure that the way ahead is something that we are all unified on and will be making a declaration at at the summit on afghanistan. there'll also be the nato strategic plan for afghanistan that will be agreed there, so there has been a lot of work done so the new government as it takes the reins of power, once

hollande is inaugurated, they are going to be stepping into an already flowing stream. so we are looking forward to talking to them and explaining this to them as they get ready to take that big step and speaking personally, i would expect that they would understand as they take the reins of power in france that in the nato context, they will be one of 28 nations that are coming together around the plans for 2014 and afterwards. france has played a very important role in the development of this plan, very important role in afghanistan so they will be taking on come as they take the reins of power, very big responsibilities to join with us and to go forward in an alliance that wants to make sure there will be an enduring presence at the 2014 and the alliance will do its best at helping the afghan ansf and the afghan government stand up and take on its role as a nation. i am sure that the discussions

that assistant secretary gordon will have will be along those lines. >> thanks to both of you. madam chair i see my time has expired. >> thank you. senator udall. >> thank you madam chair. thank you for doing this today. as all of you are aware, the united states has about 90,000 troops currently in combat missions there in afghanistan, and i think they have done an outstanding job in terms of the mission that we have entrusted to them and i think they have largely accomplished their mission. osama bin laden is dead and the taliban is no longer in power. terrorists no longer have a safe haven in afghanistan and that is why i was really encouraged when secretary panetta stated that we can bring home our combat troops as early as 2013 and this is his quote. hopefully by mid-to the latter part of 2013 will be able to make a transition from a combat

role to a training, advise-and-assist role, and quote. could you update me on his hope and where we are on that? i mean, i interpreted it at the time when he said that, that he was really moving in that direction but i haven't heard anything else and i'm wondering mr. townsend maybe you could start on where we are, because they think they there are a growing number of americans, who asked the question, why are we in these villages, and basically policing villages when we have been there for 10 years? why are the afghans doing that and it just seems to me that secretary panetta hit it on the head when he said, we need to move our combat forces out of that combat role and do everything we can to have the afghans out there on the front taking the lead, moving forward

to bear the major part of the responsibility. and i hope that is what we are pushing for, and i also hope that the chicago summit, when folks come together, that they listen to these kinds of issues and maybe reconsider that 2014 date that they have. please go ahead. >> thank you senator and i appreciate, because i question -- that is certainly where we are working towards right now with this transition. 2014 of course has been a date that came from the lisbon summit and it's an important date, both the alliance into president karzai where we will see that the afghans are taking the lead for security and taking on the front end of the combat mission from 2014 out. but what is important now and what has been underway that secretary panetta was talking about was this transition from

the u.s. and other allies being in the the lead for a lot of the combat missions, so that transitioning to the afghans. that is underway and the date of 2013 that has been discussed, we look on as a milestone along the road to 2014. 2013 is important because in terms of this transition, this is where there will be the ansf will be in the security lead who for most of afghanistan by that time. already here in 2012, he afghans are -- the afghan forces, they ansf are taking on the lead in much of afghanistan. 2013 will see i think pretty much the completion of that. doubt this has got to be facts on the ground and certainly the afghan government and the isaf commander and allies are working on this, but right now to talk to general allen and some of the commanders, we have been pretty impressed with the work of ansf and they are certainly up to the task of taking a lead in terms

of combat and that we are going to see this transition that you have mentioned and secretary panetta mentioned in terms of allied forces, u.s. forces, transitioning from combat to the advise-and-assist and letting the afghans take over as far as combat. that's what we are seeing in a great extent. 2013 will be a landmark year for that and we have seen over the past couple of months security incidences have have happened such as in kabul. they ansf has done the right thing. they stepped up and we have been buried impressed with their performance. a lot of what i hear from you in terms of your aspirations to what you want to see in terms of transition is occurring. and while we go from 2013 to 2014 will be primarily in this assist role, we have will be ready to take on combat should that happen, but i think what we are seeing is the ansf is going to be up to the task and will be largely doing this assisting and this training up to 2014. >> well it seems to me that,

before you have this firm date, whenever we said it, of getting out of afghanistan in terms of combat troops, not the counterterrorism role and all the assists assist and the other things that we clearly need to continue, that you need to really task down whether they are up to it. they need to be there in the front, doing the job, and us just being an assist role to make sure that, that we test our capabilities. and i think that is what secretary panetta was hitting on in terms of, that we have been there so long, we need to try to do everything we can to get them out and be doing the major responsibility for security and we are really only in and advise-and-assist role. i hope we are not headed for a situation where we are going to

keep pushing our date down the line. we need them to take responsibility. if they can't do it, we need to really -- a really tough firm of assessment of what is going on and a reassessment of what is going on but mr. gordon i don't know whether you were going to comment or not. you have made some notes there, but i thought that was primarily a question for mr. townsend. >> i endorse what jim townsend said and i hear what you are saying. that is precisely the point of the milestone after which our role will be primarily training, advising and assisting but we also have to be clear and honest. we can't promise that from some date in 2013 there will be no combat in afghanistan. obviously that would be ideal, but we need to make sure we succeed as well, so from the milestones primarily between advise-and-assist and by the end of 2014, combat troops are out

of afghanistan and the purpose of the discussion in chicago, and we are in on the same page for the milestone, the transition at the end of 2014 and how we make sure after 2014. >> my guess is that in chicago there is going to be a big push to try to do what secretary panetta was talking about. i think many of our nato partners in france, you are going to talk to them and i think they just see this, that we have waited too long in terms of having an afghan lead. i mean i've heard the europeans talking about this for eight years. i mean, they have talked about this should be afghan-led, security should be afghan-led and i think they are getting very impatient. i know that you all can make a commitment publicly and say, this is what we are going to

discuss at the meeting in chicago, because that would eat a big headline and everything. but i hope there is a very serious discussion about this transition and how quickly we can do it and how we make sure that this is an afghan-led security operation. >> sorry to run over madam chair but really appreciate it. >> thank you very much senator udall. in the interest of time, because we have another panel, i think we should go ahead and move on and let either senator udall or senator lee, unless you have further questions. i'm going to move onto the second panel. >> i'm ready for the second panel. >> let me thank you both very much and have a good trip to paris. secretary gordon and while we are transitioning the panels in

and out, i will take a moment to introduce the second panel. senator kerry did that a little bit, but let me point out that each of them, the next three experts has extensive experience working throughout government and in the private sector on europe and nato issues, and we are very pleased to have them join us today. first is dr. charles kupchan who is the whitney shepperton senior fellow at the council on foreign relations and a professor of international affairs in the school of foreign government at georgetown university. second is ian brzezinski who is a senior fellow at the international security program at the atlantic council and a member of the council strategic advisers group and he also leads the brzezinski group. finally is dr. hans binnendijk, who is currently the vice president for research at the national defense university and the theodore roosevelt share and national security policy at the

university. thank you all very much for being here. let me just point out, i have a statement that i'm going to submit for the record and asked dr. kupchan if you would like to give that. >> thank you very much madam chair. it's a privilege to have the opportunity to have a conversation with you today. i will simply summarize my written testimony and i would like to ask that it be submitted for the record. i think the upcoming summit in chicago represents a moment for stop taking in the sense that we have been through two decades of post-cold war nato, and i think the alliance has fared much better than any of us had expected in the sense that most alliances disappear when this threat they gave earth to it disappears but here we are in 2012 and not only is nato still in existence, but it has troops

in kosovo and afghanistan, just bought a war and the via and has partnerships around the world. so clearly the alliance is a growing concern and i also think despite the thick and thin of transatlantic relations over the last 20 years, we can relatively confidently say that the united states and europe remain each other's best partners, and that when the american president or the european leader looks out of the world and says, who do i call when there is a problem out there, the answer is the person on the other side of the atlantic. my judgment is that is not going to change anytime soon and that is partly because of the infinity of interest and value, but it's also because there are other options. even though there are emerging countries out there, i think we still count on our european allies and can rely on our european allies more than we can count on others. at the same time, think it's clear that we are at the cusp of

a major transition, and historic transition in the global landscape, in which the world that nato represents is losing the primacy that it has enjoyed for the last 200 years, and if you look at the share of global products represented by nato, and i would include japan in there because they are part of the western world since world war ii, you have fallen from roughly 70% of global product to 50% and we are now headed toward 40%. that says to me that the big security questions of the day are about how we are going to manage the transition. the big challenge is to american security moving forward are not in the atlantic community but outside the atlantic community. and the consequence and the relevance of this alliance to us into our european allies, but i think more to us, it because we are a global power, will be what is nato doing in this wider world?

how is nato keeping the united states safe as the global distribution of power shifts in the years and decades ahead? and i would like to simply offer a few comments on that broad subject of nato and the wider world. first, i think it's important to keep in mind that nato represents a primary institutional infrastructure of the west and a kind of keeps us together as a meaningful political community. that is particularly important when some of the emerging powers around us don't share our values and don't share our interests. i think one of the ran strategic questions of our time is how can we preserve the rules-based system that the u.s. and the europeans have together built since world war ii as the circle widens and as more players join the table? this is not a conversation that is front and center on nato's agenda but i think it has to be moving forward, because the

west, it becomes together, if nato coheres and generates a plan for managing this transition, think it will withstand the test of time. if the united states in europe go their separate ways and figuring out how to preserve a rules-based system, then i fear that the next 20 or 30 years will be a very bumpy period and international history. the second in this respect, i think that nato needs to establish itself as a global security hub. bad in my mind is not -- does not mean that nato should go global. i think the global nato would you bridge too far. it would be a step that would burden the alliance with political requests and material requests and that it would be unable to sustained. in that respect, think we should be sober and cautious about thinking of nato as the military alliance of last resort for missions moving forward. yes, nato went into afghanistan,

guess we will hopefully leave together, guess we just finished a mission and libya that was reasonably successful but i think the take-away from afghanistan and libya should the sobriety, not the next nato deployment, and that is because the afghan mission has been somewhat successful. not a smashing success. we are chasing at the bit to get out. as you were just saying senator, i think that it will be a long time coming before nato engages in the same kind of operations that it engaged in afghanistan. libya i think's success successes more conclusive but many of the conditions that were present and libya are not replicated elsewhere, particularly in syria. the u.n. legal authority, the approval of the arab world, the degree to which libya was close to reservoirs of european power and therefore easier for the

europeans to do even though they still relied heavily on us. in that regard, think some of the most important nato programs moving forward will not be the deployment of force, even though surely there will be some of that. they will be the broad array of programs, the partnerships, the mediterranean dialogue, the istanbul cooperation, the sport for the african union, the training mission in iraq which is already concluded. i think in many respects nato has to help other regions do for themselves what nato has done for the atlantic community. deepen integration, understand what it means to work together and gradually build this solidarity that preserves regional -- two final comments. one is that, and we have already discuss this morning, i think -- thinking about the ability of nato to be a global hub, nato to service the institutional core

of the west during this period of transition and i think it requires a european pillar that stands up to the plate. and this issue i think is more pressing today than it has ever been before. we have had that dates about burden sharing since nato was born but during the cold war, that debate only went so far because the europeans were quite confident that we were there and that if something went wrong the united states would show up at the party. i think right now, we are seeing a world where the europeans know that they need to do more, where our drawdown in europe is justified and inevitable but i think it does put a fire to defeated the the feet of the europeans about the need to do more to balance the alliance. i am skeptical that the europeans will spend more on defense. in fact i would go so far as to say, they are going to be spending less and less than that

is because for the foreseeable future they are going to be worried about bailing out greece, how to deal with the debt, how to save the eurozone and perhaps even the european union. that says to me that we should be pressing them not so much about spending, because i think that is running into a brick wall, but on rationalizing how it is spent, getting more bang for the buck, but adding them to pool their resources. that in my mind is the best way to get europe to become more capable. in many respects that involves much closer links between nato and the european union. heinle, think that it would be remiss for me not to make the following point, which is not going to be in the summit in chicago but i think should be in the back of our minds. and that is from the very beginning of the atlantic partnership, our strength abroad has depended upon hours drink at home. our economy, our political results and in some ways what i'm most worried about today as

i testified before the committee, is not whether we get enlargement right. it's not when and how we get out of afghanistan. it is the degree to which we are now stumbling in the west collectively in terms of our economy, the european union, pulling apart and experience a renationalization that we have not seen since world war ii in our own political system here going through a very rough patch. so my final thought would be, it's impossible to think about, talk about and imagine nato's feature without doing the hard work of getting our houses in order. in the end of the day nato will only be as strong as its individual member states. we have a lot of work to do on that front. thank you very much. >> thank you mr. brzezinski. [inaudible]

>> the to get a little closer to the mic so we could hear better. >> is that better? as a former staffer, senate staffer who served on this committee and prior to that the late senator of william d. ross, it's a pleasure to return to these halls. if you recall the strong bipartisan leadership this committee brought, the effort to extend nato membership to the democracy of central europe, those were historic decisions. they strengthen the alliance and they strengthened security. the chicago summit is going to be important in large part because the context in which it takes place. that context includes a war in afghanistan for which both the united states and europe appear to disengage and, economic crises on both sides of the atlantic, diminishing or a trophy and defense capabilities, data is qualified success in libya, one that nonetheless raised questions by the u.s. commitment to nato and

highlighting european defense shortfalls. and of course the recent u.s. defense guidance that reached a pivotal age and initiates another reduction in the american forces stationed in europe. some of us started -- stated that this should be an implementation on the afghan operation and reviews alliance progress under a new strategic context. in light of our concept, and lot of our context that would be insufficient. that would reinforce the sense of nato's growing irrelevance and further process of trying to -- so you asked what would be the one central message from the chicago summit. my view, if the chicago summit had one over all purposes should be to provide incredible reaffirmation to the transatlantic organ one in which the united states demonstrates real commitment to europe's regional security interests and our european allies should stand with united states to address global challenges in transatlantic security. toward that end, the u.s. should

pursue five priorities at the chicago summit. first and foremost, the president must critically reaffirm europe's centrality to its global strategy. the drifting apart of the two continents has many causes but they include a u.s. transatlantic agenda whose dominant tolerance recently have been a vaguely defined set of guidance from russia and the proposed missile defense architecture and still remains conditional. the decision to further reduce u.s. forces stationed in europe appears in the context of increasingly assertive russian foreign-policy. just last week, russia's chief of the general staff threatened to launch a preemptive strike against proposed missile defense sites in central europe. washington should remove the conditionality that still hangs over u.s. missile defense plans for asia. that conditionality and not only undercuts confidence, your pain confidence in the u.s. commitment to build those sites, it certainly incentivizes

kremlin opposition. the u.s. military drawdown will also make it important to ensure that the remaining forces in europe are fully equipped and funded and equally important, careful consideration has to be given to how in the future the united states and europe will sustain their military interoperability. the way we fight a war in the united states fights were become so technologically complex there is not much more difficult and challenging and time-consuming to remain it with interoperability to allied forces. it is not yet clear how interoperability will be sustained as the united states further reduces its forces in europe and continued ambiguity on this issue communicates disinterest not in just the regional security concerns of our allies but also in their role as potential partners in operations. second, chicago summit should be used to reanimate the vision of europe's whole free and secure as a guiding priority to the alliance and the united states

should be leading this effort. europe is undivided -- to be more stable and secure continent, one better able to address global concerns in partnership with the united states. imagine europe today that did not integrate poland, the baltics romania, bulgaria into nato with the e.u. have extended membership all of them? would russia and poland have a path to thought -- mourner modulations? to revitalize the process nato enlargement the alliance can and should at the summit declared its intent to -- no later than the next summit of qualified candidates. underscore there resolved and the macedonia dispute with greece or the last remaining impediment to its accession to the alliance. it should assert that george is path and nato can be through the existing nato commission and they should applaud montney grow's significant progress in the membership action plan. third, the alliance matures way forward in financial is very.

resource constraints are a double-edged sword. they can hault multinational cooperation and generate division and indeed we see a little bit of that today has a central europeans watched aghast as germany, france and italy saw military increment to russia in their effort the effort to sustain their respective national defense industries. allow me to commend senator lugar and the research service for their recently published study examined the sales. hope this report will prompt the allies to take action on this potentially divisive issue. austerity can be leveraged to try forward need a neither party station innovation and collaboration. i'm glad the alliance plans to rollout force 2020 instead of long-term capable of the goals but i hope it will give equal if not greater emphasis to near-term multinational projects that exist -- such projects are shared logistic hubs, platforms are needed and they are urgently needed. there also projects that are more credible to nato publics

than promising's in the distant future. four, the summer should be used to expand and deepen partnerships in the alliance developed around the world. sweden, australia and new zealand, korea jordan to uae and others other non-nato members have made important contributions to isaf, the libyan mission and other alliance operations. in addition to military capability they bring diplomatic leverage as well as needed inside intelligence regarding the respective localities and regions. nato should expand the partnership for peace that is open to all qualified regardless of geography. this a contribute more militarily should have the opportunity to be certified as nato's interoperable and certified would then be allowed to participate in different nato programs. be at nato exercises come integrated command structure centers of excellence or civilian agencies. finally of course, nato in

chicago needs to demonstrate unambiguous determination to sustain a stable afghanistan. i hope nader will be able to commit to a strategic partnership with kabul that will endure well beyond 2014. the recently signed u.s. afghanistan agreement is an important step but even if it is flushed out rupp wesley will be insufficient to ensure success in afghanistan and the absence of a long-term transatlantic commitment. strong leadership has always been a prerequisite for nato's by renzi and success. likewise, europe's ability and willingness to contribute no terry forces and local capital necessary to address regional and global concerns are equally essential. it is neither an europe's nor the united states's interest to allow the transatlantic bargain that is done so well over the last decade to drift into relevance. relevant. the chicago summit credibly reaffirms it will serve as important if not inspiring benchmark of american commitment and european ambition regarding

the transatlantic alliance. thank you for the opportunity to share my views. >> thank you very much and let me just point out that you mentioned the report that was done, the senator lugar requested on the recent sales of military equipment. i would just like to point out, we will be submitting that for the record so thank you for raising that. dr. binnendijk. >> madam chairman, senator udall let me also say it's a great pleasure to be back on this committee. i spent a decade of my life in those seats back there serving this committee on both sides of the aisle actually and i was just recalling my first boss up here was hubert humphrey for the vice president so i'm sort of dating myself. i wanted to make just a few very general comments about the summit and then focus in on what i was asked to talk about which is military and defense capabilities and i've might ask that i full statement be placed in the record. i will just add live a little bit if i might. first let me say that if you look at past summits they often

tend to be turning points in the direction of the alliance, look back to the roman london some of. it was turning the alliance from the cold war into sustaining alliance. madrid was about enlargement, really a change in the alliance in that sense. prague was about military transformation of the alliance. lisbon was a new strategic concept in a new direction for the alliance politically so the question is, what will they chicago summit, what will be its focus? i think the headline will certainly be afghanistan. senator udall and the kinds of questions you were focusing on. it will be about, how do you transition, how do you bring to an together, together formula, a formula for the proposed 2014 period? but i think the other two elements of this summit both capabilities and partnerships are also very important.

dr. kupchan talked a bit about partnerships. i think this is extremely important because the alliance basically will not fight by itself any more. wherever it goes, in and out of various operations it will have partners than it needs to have capable partners. i don't see this particular summit basket is being full of this point. i think more work needs to be done. i think there are real opportunities to make our partners interoperable, to certify that, give them better consultation arrangements and i think better work and still be done between now at chicago on that. but let me turn my attention to no terry capabilities because that is what i was asked to talk about and i want to raise for problems. i want to argue that the this summit will take steps and reach a case to begin to alleviate those problems. the first problem has been addressed already in some depth.

that is the collapse of the european defense spending. a little over a decade ago, begin a spent about half of total nato defense spending. right now it's about 69%. the united states today spends about 4.8% of its gdp on defense. the alliance average now is about 1.6 and falling. to 2% figure that we talked about, there are only a handful of european allies that spend that much. that creates problems. personnel costs remain about the same. for europe, they are funding operations out of their current budgets, unlike we do at a supplemental. what does that mean? that means there are procurement accounts that are being hurt very badly. they are cutting into the future. their cuts are not being coordinated. with nato or really with many others. these are national decisions and

that has to change. we have done an assessment at any you about the impact of this and we have seen what you might call horizontal cuts initially, where you are cutting across of course and that tends to hollow out, tends to make the forces less ready, less sustainable and now they are moving to a vertical cut where they are taking entire chunks of capability out of the forest. you see this with the dutch in the armory and you see it with the danish and the submarines it easy with the british and their carrier capabilities. so this is a problem for the future. now the summit i think we'll will take steps in the right direction. i think we are going to see some kind of a commitment out of the summit to identify the core capabilities the alliance needs and to try to protect that core and to also create kind of an aspirational view where we should be going and that would be called nato force 2020. i think the summit will continue the lisbon capabilities commitment and the work that was done there and will continue command structure reform.

what will be new here is what secretary rasmussen called smart defense. that is really about pooling and sharing. somebody referred to it as let's go by together. that is not a bad start. there will be about 20 projects or so that will be put on the table to demonstrate the smart defense will have some meat on the bones and then there will be what is called the connected forests initiative. the danger here is that the interoperability, military interoperability between the united states and our european allies, it's good now because we have been operating together but post-afghanistan it's very fragile. so we need to start thinking now about how to continue to maintain that interoperability. it will be an initiative that the summit, to try to do that. i think more needs to be done to deal with this problem. my view is that, as things get worse, we are going to have to have a much higher degree of rules specialization within the alliance which means allies will have to be able to trust their

fellow allies. they're going to concentrate on a certain capability, certain role. they are going to have to trust their allies. that trust is not there yet so we have to build that trust to move in that direction. i think our own eucom command needs to become much more of an interoperability command. eucom has been a lily pad where we have moved forward to areas of operations in afghanistan and iraq in the past. that has to change. eucom has to be about maintaining the interoperability of our forces and ice they said we need to do much more with our partners. the second problem -- though that is the first. the second problem is missile defense. you know the story here, the iranian threat building, russia trying to limit the european phase adaptive approach and to get as much detail as they can. i think this is a success story for the summit.

there is a consensus in the alliance that we need to move forward with missile defense and that is a really solid consensus and it's a good thing. we will be able to announce at the summit that there will be an interim capability for missile defense. if you look at both the technical and the political achievement here over the last couple of years, they are great. we have deployed radar from turkey. we will be deploying missile interceptors in romania and poland. we will be home porting for aegis destroyers in spain. we have got an agreement on a command-and-control system for the alliance for the dmd and the dutch and others will be building up their radar capabilities. there is a whole long list of things that the allies have done to build on this consensus and i think that is good news. the problem in all of this of course is that we cannot get the russians to cooperate. i think they are concerned about

countries and their so-called -- participating in this and they are concerned about where phase three and four will go and will this concern some threat to their capability. we have gone out of her way to ensure them that it will not undermine the deterrent capability. i think it's important for us to continue to try in cooperation with the russians and this is important standing out with a way of a member of things. so far, the obama administration has been very successful in putting forward good ideas to the russians, but not crossing those red lines. the third problem very quickly has to do with nuclear deterrence and i was asked to say a few words about the deterrence and defense posture review. this is really about nuclear deterrence in europe. we have hundreds of nuclear

weapons,, that the united states owens forwarded put in europe and as we know the germans and others have been putting pressure on the system to reduce those. the strategic concept that came out of lisbon designed a very nice formula for this. it said that the alliance will remain for nuclear lines as long as they were nuclear weapons that we will try to create the conditions for further reductions. no unilateral action and that the aim of all of this should be to create greater transparency for russian systems and give russian systems relocated out of your. i think that is a good appointment. what happened subsequently there was additional pressure to try to change that and i think that is what was behind the turns and defense posture review. to its credit i think the administration has been able to work with that deterrence and defense posture review and it has not been made public yet, but i believe that the

conclusion of that is that the current mix is sound, and that is an important conclusion to make. the fourth problem is and ian mentioned this, is reassurance and article v. is privileged to work with secretary albright. i was one of revisers in fertilizers and a group of experts. this was probably the single most important issue that we tackled. out of our work, and in the new strategic concept, to very clear statement about the importance of article v, reinforcing that. what has happened subsequently is that both european defense cuts, but also russian intimidation, has led to some opening up of that question again. is reassurance really what we said it would be at lisbon? with regard to article v. i think a number things have happened since then that should